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ABSTRACT 
This study is designed empirically to investigate the impact of tax holiday on 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the case of Indonesia for the period from 1981 to 
2010. Ordinary Least Square regression technique is applied by employing foreign 
direct investment inflow as dependent variable, along with tax holiday as 
independent variable and gross domestic product growth, gross fixed capital 
formation, inflation, openness, tax rate as controlled variables. In addition, this study 
also attempts to analyze historical tax holiday regulation and its effect on foreign 
direct investment trend during period 1958 to 2010. Considerations and background 
of tax holiday regulations along with their implementation are thoroughly analyzed 
to have a comprehensive understanding of their effectiveness and efficiency in 
attracting FDI. 
The empirical estimation on four variables has shown significant impact on 
FDI inflow. Those variables are gross fixed capital formation, inflation, openness 
and tax rate. Tax holiday as the main focused independent variable is proven to be 
not significant in attracting FDI inflow. The reason for this finding is that tax 
holiday will never be able to offset inadequate infrastructure, economic and political 
instability, and poor government policies.  
With regard to tax holiday regulation analysis, this study found inconsistency 
in the first implementation of tax holiday under Soekarno regime which resulted in 
skeptical among investors. Moreover, uncertainty in extending tax holiday facility 
were prevalent under Suharto Regime as a result of no clear criteria in selecting 
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which investors are eligible to receive tax holiday. Discretionary policy approach 
applied by Suharto Regime in selecting tax holiday recipient led both government 
officials and investors into corruption, cronyism, and nepotism practice.  
Keyword: Foreign Direct Investment, Tax Holiday, Tax Rate, Indonesia 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
In the post crisis era, the Indonesia's annual economic growth has been 
relatively low compared to that of neighboring countries. One reason behind this is 
the low level of investment rate from both domestic and external sources. For 
developing countries like Indonesia, investment is the first step in which economic 
development activities begin. Fluctuation in investment will influence countries’ 
economic growth.  Therefore, in order to maintain economic growth, countries are 
endeavoring to establish a healthy investing climate for stimulating investment from 
both domestic and international sources.  
UNCTAD (2012) pointed out in its report that out of many investment 
sources, domestic investments are still representing the majority of total investment 
in developing countries. Foreign direct investment (FDI) can only complement this 
role. However, FDI could play a distinct and influential role in promoting growth 
and sustainable development, boosting countries’ competitiveness, generating 
employment, and reducing social and income disparities.  Moreover, FDI is 
considered to be more resilient toward crisis, since investors commonly have a long-
term perspective when investing in a country and it has the nature of risk sharing 
between recipient countries and investor. Therefore, FDI provides a stronger 
stimulus to economic growth than other types of capital flows. Additional argument 
is that FDI is not just a mere capital flows, but also offers access to new 
technologies and managerial skills. 
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Since 1980, FDI inflow in the world has rapidly increased, especially to 
developing countries. It reached culmination point around the year 2007 where 
global FDI inflows attained USD 2.3 billion. After experiencing a declining during 
the period of 2001-2003, FDI inflows began to show an upward trend in 2005 -2007. 
Unfortunately, after then, it showed a declining trend until 2009. In 2010, global 
FDI inflow reached an estimated $1,244 billion (figure 1.1) – a little increase from 
2009’s level of $1,185 billion. However, there was an uneven pattern between 
regions and also between subregions. FDI inflows to developed countries and 
transitional economies contracted further in 2010. In contrast, those to developing 
economies recovered strongly, and together with transitional economies – for the 
first time – surpassed the 50 per cent mark of global FDI flows (UNCTAD, 2012). 
Figure 1.1:  FDI inflows, global and by the group of economies, 1980–2010  
(Billion of dollars) 
 
    Sources: www.unctad.org/fdistatistics 
FDI has played a crucial role in business internationalization. Massive 
changes have taken place both in terms of size, scope, and methods of FDI in the last 
decade. These changes occur because of developments in technology, relaxing 
restrictions on foreign investment barriers in many countries, as well as deregulation 
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and privatization of many industries. Development of information technology 
systems, as well as, more affordable cost in global communication allows foreign 
investment to be managed easier. 
Based on the data provided by the Word Development Indicators (WDI), it is 
known that the FDI inflow into Indonesia after the crisis in 1998 was still lower than 
before the crisis. Even in subsequent years after the crises, the amount of net FDI 
flows during period 1998-2001 and 2003 recorded a negative rate, which means that 
there was a capital flight.  
Table 1-1:  FDI Inflow to Indonesia, 1994 - 2010 
Year 
Value (US $) 
1994  $         2,109,000,000.00  
1995  $         4,346,000,000.00  
1996  $         6,194,000,000.00  
1997  $         4,677,000,000.00  
1998  $          (240,800,000.00) 
1999  $      (1,865,620,963.49) 
2000  $      (4,550,355,285.71) 
2001  $      (2,977,391,857.14) 
2002  $            145,085,548.72  
2003  $          (596,923,827.79) 
2004  $         1,896,082,770.00  
2005  $         8,336,257,207.64  
2006  $         4,914,201,435.40  
2007  $         6,928,480,000.00  
2008  $         9,318,453,649.83  
2009  $         4,877,369,178.44  
2010  $      13,370,580,771.01  
   Source : WDI 
In the New Order era under Suharto administration, investment in the form 
of FDI is an essential driving factor in achieving high economic growth and 
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maintaining sustainable development.  Moreover, the presence of FDI in Indonesia, 
particularly in the manufacturing industry becomes a source of technological 
development, export growth and labor absorption.  Manufacturing or processing 
industry is the only economic sector that has generated the greatest added value and 
the largest contributor to the GDP of Indonesia. This evidence can be seen from the 
structure of Indonesia's GDP in 2004 - 2011 as presented in Table 1.2.  
Table 1-2 GDP Structure, 2004 - 2011 
Sector 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010* 2011** 
1. Agriculture, Marine, Forestry 14.3 13.1 13.0 13.7 14.5 15.3 15.3 14.7 
2. Mining and Energy 8.9 11.1 11.0 11.2 10.9 10.6 11.2 11.9 
3. Industry 28.1 27.4 27.5 27.1 27.8 26.4 24.8 24.3 
4. Electricity, Gas, Water 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 
5. Construction 6.6 7.0 7.5 7.7 8.5 9.9 10.3 10.2 
6. Trade, Hotel, Restaurant 16.1 15.6 15.0 14.9 14.0 13.3 13.7 13.8 
7. Transportation and 
Communication 
6.2 6.5 6.9 6.7 6.3 6.3 6.6 6.6 
8. Finance, Real Estate 8.5 8.3 8.1 7.7 7.4 7.2 7.2 7.2 
9. Services 10.3 10.0 10.1 10.1 9.7 10.2 10.2 10.5 
*.   Estimation 
**. Rough Estimation 
Source: http://www.bps.go.id/tab_sub/view.php?tabel=1&daftar=1&id_subyek=11&notab=5 
 
Analyzing Table 1.2, we can infer that industry sector should have been able 
to act as push or pull factor for developing output and growth of other economic 
sectors. For having the ability as pull and push factor, industry sector should be well 
designed in optimal function, well developed and highly competitive. Unfortunately, 
the competitiveness of Indonesian industries has deteriorated after the economic 
crisis in 1998 due to aggravation of the investment climate in Indonesia. 
According to Thierry Geiger (2011) in his book as a part of the results of an 
annual survey on countries’ competitiveness conducted by the World Economic 
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Forum (WEF), the eight most problematic elements for doing business in Indonesia 
are inefficient government bureaucracy, corruption, inadequate supply of 
infrastructure, financial access, inflation, government instability, political instability 
and tax regulation. The complete problematic factors mentioned above are provided 
in figure 1.2.  Moreover, Bank Indonesia (2011) suggested that in supporting 
national economic development, increasing investment level particularly foreign 
investment is inevitable. Therefore, enhancement in conducive investment 
environment should be established by infrastructure’s revitalization and regulation’s  
improvement. Among the improvements in regulation are implementation of 
national single window and improvement in tax regulations especially related to tax 
incentives.  
Figure 1. 2: The Most Problematic Factors For Doing Business in Indonesia (2010) 
 
Source: The Indonesia Competitiveness Report 2011 WEF 
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Exercising tax incentives in enticing foreign direct investment is not a new 
method. According to Morisset & Pirnia (1999), when other factors such as 
infrastructure, cost of production, economic and political stability are more or less 
equal, tax regulation may have a significant effect on investors’ choices.  This effect 
varies, however, depending on the tax instrument used, the characteristics of the 
multinational company, and the relationship between the tax systems of the home 
and recipient countries. 
Moreover, in a more competitive world, exercising tax incentives to attract 
FDI has become a global phenomenon. Some countries in Asia and Africa rely on 
tax holidays and import duty exemptions to entice FDI while those in Western 
Europe prefer to apply accelerated depreciation (UNCTAD, 1995). This competition 
will encourage developing countries to enact tax regulations that tend to be more 
beneficial for FDI company than achieving their tax revenue target. However, there 
should be a balance that might lead developing country to win both tax revenue 
target and FDI inflow. This research addresses the question of ANALYZING THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TAX HOLIDAY AND FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT IN INDONESIA by combining both quantitative method using 
ordinary least square method and qualitative method by providing a descriptive 
history of Indonesian tax holiday regulation in relation to FDI inflow. 
1.2. Research Problem 
Investments particularly FDI is perceived to be potentially significant to 
promote economic growth. In addition, the presence of foreign capital can be a 
source of technological development, export growth and employment. Therefore, 
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developing countries like Indonesia and ASEAN countries are very enthusiastic and 
eager to attract FDI. One of factors influencing FDI that is still controversial is tax 
holiday, a form of tax incentive facilities. Accordingly, there is a need to have more 
empirical evidences about the relationship between tax holiday and FDI. Better 
understanding on the issue will allow us to design better policies in attracting FDI. 
Based on this standing point, this study tries to answer those two important research 
questions: 
1. What is the relationship between tax holiday provision and foreign direct 
investment inflow? 
2. What are the implications of the relationship between tax holiday and foreign 
direct investment inflow? 
1.3. Research Objective 
The available literature on the FDI can be categorized into four types. First is 
macroeconomics studies regarding the determinants of FDI. Second, 
macroeconomic analysis on the effects of FDI and other capital inflows toward some 
key elements of macroeconomic development. Third, studies regarding long lists of 
incentives and disincentives offered by host countries to establish favorable 
investment climate. Finally, microeconomic studies regarding the influence of FDI 
on effectiveness and productive efficiency of domestic companies compared to the 
multinational companies.  This present study falls on the third category of study 
regarding long lists of incentives and disincentives offered by host countries to 
establish favorable investment climate.  
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This empirically examines the relationship between the tax holiday provision 
as one of FDI incentives and FDI inflow in Indonesia. The objectives of this 
research are to: 
1. Analyze the relationships between tax holiday and foreign direct investment in 
Indonesia. 
2. Analyze the existing tax holiday regulation and its effect on foreign direct 
investment as well as explore the explanation for the existing relationship 
among them. 
3. Acquire empirical evidence regarding the transmission mechanisms through 
which  tax holiday influences foreign direct investment. 
The benefits of this research include: 
1. Providing a contribution to the Indonesian Government in formulating 
appropriate tax incentive facilities for attracting FDI. 
2. Contributing to the body of knowledge in the area of tax policies of public 
finance in general. 
1.4. Research Scope 
Out of many determinant factors of FDI, I focused on tax holiday as an 
incentive determinant factor in alluring FDI inflow. To have a robust empirical 
result in performing the quantitative method using Ordinary Least Square method, I 
also include some other determinant factors as control variables, such as gross 
domestic product growth (GDP Growth) as a proxy for market size, gross fixed 
capital formation (GFCF) as a proxy for infrastructure, trade openness as a proxy for 
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government policy, inflation as a proxy for economic stability, and tax rate. Those 
data were retrieved from World Development Indicators 2012. 
Regarding the time frame of this research, in qualitative analysis of tax 
holiday regulations, I picked out regulation from a very early government gazette 
enacted in 1958 to the current one in 2010. However, in performing the quantitative 
estimation I only included data from period 1981 – 2010 considering the data 
availability.  
One of the limitations of this study is cost analysis of tax holiday regulation 
in attracting FDI inflow due to the difficulty in both data source and complicated 
calculation. However, the idea of cost analysis of tax holiday can be a subject of 
further research after knowing the relationship and impact of tax holiday on FDI 
inflow. 
1.5. Organization of the Study 
This study is organized into five chapters:  
Chapter 1: provides the background of study, research problem and objective of 
study, and the research approach. 
Chapter 2: presents the literature review. It describes the definition of foreign direct 
investments, several FDI theories and determinant factors of FDI. 
Regarding tax incentives, any type of tax incentives will be explained 
here together with its definition and argument.  
Chapter 3: presents the research methodology. Data collection, model specification, 
data processing and model evaluation will be presented in this chapter.  
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Chapter 4: discusses the finding. Empirical quantitative results based on Ordinary 
Least Square is presented and analyzed. In addition, historical analysis 
of tax holiday regulation and its effect on FDI inflow is investigated.  
Chapter 5:  concludes the study and presents the policy implications.  
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CHAPTER 2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, several theoretical frameworks of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) will be discussed along with its determinant factors. In addition, special FDI’s 
determinant factor, which is the main focus of this, i.e. tax holiday will be 
elucidated.  
2.1. Foreign Direct Investment Definition 
Capital inflows from abroad can be divided into three categories, namely 
foreign debt, portfolio investment and foreign direct investment (FDI). In general, 
FDI is a form of direct capital investment engaged in various fields. Excluded from 
FDI inflows are investment in the form of portfolio, shares on the stock, bonds and 
other securities. Compared to debt, FDI is often regarded as a more profitable and 
more secure in financing the country’s development. The main reason for that 
opinion lays in FDI scheme where business failure risk is borne by foreign investors, 
while for debt financing, the country concerned (in any condition) should bear the 
risk and oblige to pay the debt principal plus interest. Moreover, FDI is associated 
with direct ownership, control of plant, equipment and infrastructure which help to 
finance the creation of capacity growth in an economy, while the short-term foreign 
debt is more frequently used to finance consumption. 
Before we proceed further to the body of literature review, it is worth to 
discuss several conceptual issues related to FDI definition. Out of all plethora 
sources of FDI, an agreement has been reached regarding the main objective of FDI 
which is to obtain and manage an asset in foreign (host) country. According to 
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OECD (2008), foreign direct investment (FDI) can be categorized as an investment 
in destined country (in this case host country) conducted by resident enterprise in the 
origin country (in this case investing country) which objective is to hold lasting 
interest. Another world wide definition of FDI is offered by World Bank.  World 
Bank (2012) defined FDI as investment inflow to a country (host country)  other 
than investor’s country (home country) to obtain longterm interest or management 
control over companies operating in a host country. The investment inflow could be 
in the form of equity capital, long term or short term capital or reinvested earnings.  
Furthermore, according to OECD (2008), the longterm interest represents the 
presence of a lasting relationship marked by a significant degree of influence on the 
management of the direct investee company held by the direct investor.  However, 
Fry (1993) believed that direct investor’s influence over an investee company does 
not necessarily attain 100% ownership since it can be carried out regardless 100% 
ownership in equity financing. The reason for this is that financing entire or part of 
companies’ establishment can be done by borrowing from host countries financial 
institutional. Even though there is no compromise agreement about what degree of 
influence is, most economists agree that a minimum of 10 percent managerial 
ownership allows foreign investor to exercise significant influence over the key 
policies in managerial decision. 
Some researchers may argue that minimum 10 percent share requirement is 
not necessary because, in some cases, some investor’s ownerships of 10 percent 
voting power may not have any significant effect on management’s decision while 
other investors who own less than 10 percent have an effective voice in the 
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management. However, it is a unanimous agreement that any qualified ownership 
below 10 percent is not considered as having significant influence over 
management’s decision. 
All in all, regardless the level of investors’ ownership, researchers agreed 
that the main difference between FDI and other portfolio investment is the existence 
of  significant influence over investee’s management. This condition should be  
interpreted in the sense that no investors are willing to  allocate fund, unless they 
have majority control over Investee Company. 
2.2. Foreign Direct Investment Theory 
The fast growing and reliability of FDI compared to other capital instruments 
has brought interest to the development theory of FDI. Some FDI theories tried to 
explain why companies participate in FDI, what are the considerations of selecting 
one destined country over the others, and why they prefer a specific entry mode to 
host countries. From the host country point of views, other FDI theories explained 
why one country succeed in attracting FDI while others remain stagnant in FDI 
growth, what incentives are more preferable to investors in establishing attractive 
investing environment.  
According to Moosa (2002), theories of FDI can be classified into four types: 
(1) Theories assuming perfect market; (2) theories assuming imperfect market; (3) 
other theories; (4) theories based on other variables.  The following section will 
discuss in detail each of theory.  
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2.2.1.    Theories Assuming Perfect Market 
There are three hypotheses under this theory: (1) the differential rate of 
return; (2) the diversification of hypothesis; (3) the output and market size 
hypothesis. 
The Differential Rate of Return 
The gist of differential rate of return hypothesis is that capital flows from the 
country with a lower rate of return to the country with a higher rate of return and 
eventually leads to equality of the real rate of return. In this hypothesis, business risk 
is assumed to be neutral regardless investing location, making real rate of return as 
an isolated variable in investment decision. Business risk neutrality means that an 
investor considers foreign market as perfect substitution of the domestic market. 
As this hypothesis represents one of the first efforts in elaborating FDI 
theory, many researchers have tested this hypothesis by examining the relationship 
between FDI inflow and rate of return in several countries. Unfortunately, most of 
them failed to provide supporting evidence relevant to this hypothesis (Agarwal, 
1980). 
Yang (1999) in his research on FDI in China between rich coastal area and 
poor inland area attempted to adjust the role of rate of return by inputting human 
capital variable. The result suggested that majority FDI in china flows to rich coastal 
area even though poor inland area offers a higher rate of return. Perhaps, human 
capital adjusted the differential rate of return effect between rich coastal area and 
poor inland area. 
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According to Moosa (2002), the failure in supporting this hypothesis, arose 
from inconsistency of this hypothesis. This is because in this hypothesis, capital only 
flows in one direction, which is from a lower rate of return country to a higher rate 
of return country. This hypothesis fundamentally failed in explaining why countries 
experience inflow and outflow of FDI simultaneously even if they have a higher rate 
of return than others. 
Moreover, Moosa (2002) stated that, the validity of this hypothesis was 
questioned even on theoretical ground. First, there could be other reasons than the 
rate of return to explain why companies invest abroad. Maximizing sales to reach 
market penetration, logical and operational reason for benefitting resource 
endowment in host countries, or circumventing trade barrier are other reasons for 
this capital inflow. More importantly is the diversification of risk by minimizing risk 
per rate of return if companies expand its operation abroad. These flaws will be 
patched up by next hypothesis. 
Portfolio Hypothesis 
In Portfolio Hypothesis, investors do not only consider rate of return, but 
also incorporate risk of business in investment decision. This hypothesis postulates 
investment as a positive function on rate of return and a negative function on risk of 
business. When risk of business is included, then investment diversification becomes 
relevant.  Rather than selecting countries exclusively on higher rate of return, capital 
mobility now also flows by desire to minimize risk by diversification. 
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One method for testing this hypothesis is by examining the relationship of 
business risk and rate of return on investment flow to a group of countries. The 
result was summarized by Agarwal (1980). He concluded that empirical evidence in 
favor of this theory seems to be weak. For example, Steven (1969) in his work on 
aggregate direct investment to Latin America countries could not obtain any 
empirical evidence in supporting this theory. Moosa (2002) concluded that some 
problems might be encountered when testing this hypothesis such as: (1) risk and 
return are calculated from reported profit which are absurd to be equal to actual 
profit for several reasons, including accounting methods and transfer pricing; (2) 
risk variable cannot be accurately measured by calculating standard deviation of 
historical data. 
However, this hypothesis is preferable to differential rate of return 
hypothesis for some reasons. First, it considers business risks which constitute vital 
element in business decision. Second, it proposes logical reason on the existence of 
cross investment intra countries. 
Output and Market Size Hypotheses 
Output and market size hypotheses are considered as identical. Output 
hypothesis is attributable to micro level and assume a positive relationship between 
companies’ FDI and its output or sales in the host country. On the other hand, 
market size hypothesis is perceived to be reliable at a macro level. In this 
hypothesis, FDI is considered as a function of market size in the host country, and 
commonly proxied by GDP or GNP.  Agarwal (1980) pointed out that the rationale 
behind these hypotheses is supported by the domestic experience that firms will 
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increase their investment following up their increasing sales, as well as domestic 
investment in a country which rises with its increasing market size or GDP. 
The relationship between FDI and output or market size is derived from 
neoclassical domestic investment theories, in which the foremost one is the 
Jogerson’s Model in 1963. However, in market size hypothesis, there is a lack of 
theoretical background for using GDP as a proxy for countries’ market size even 
though many empirical studies already utilized it. Most of them concerned with the 
association between FDI and host country’s market size statistically than with the 
theoretical basis of why this association exist. 
Among those researchers attempting to test this hypothesis are Moore 
(1993), Bajo-Rivero (1994), Wang and Swain (1995), and Mhlanga, et al (2009). All 
of them implemented real GDP for representing country’s market size as 
determinant variable on FDI inflow and unanimously agreed its significance as FDI 
determinant. Other researchers employed different proxies for market size such as 
GDP Growth and GDP per capita. Lage-Hidalgo & Love (2000) implemented GDP 
per capita as a proxy for market size in explaining FDI inflow from USA to Mexico. 
By using a simple model, Lage-Hidalgo & Love (2000) found a significant 
relationship between FDI inflow as dependent variable and market size (proxied by 
GDP per capita) as independent variable. They also concluded that cost factor 
between two countries is significant, and their model was able to explain two-third 
of FDI inflow from USA into Mexico for period 1967-1994. Moreover, Mohamed & 
Sidiropoulos (2010) concluded that market size and institutional variables are both 
significant with a positive sign as expected. GDP growth as an indicator of market 
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prospects has a positive contribution on FDI inflow in Middle East and North Africa 
Countries. 
Regardless many supported evidence on this hypothesis, Agarwal (1980) 
alerted us to be caution when interpreting the significance of this relationship for 
some reasons. First, the size and growth of host countries’ market are very likely 
influence FDI inflow in producing goods or services to satisfy domestic market, but 
not FDI intended to produce for export. In this case, FDI inflow falls into import-
substitution category rather than export-oriented. Unfortunately, most studies, failed 
to distinguish FDI volume between these two categories. Second, even though there 
is significant relationship between FDI and GDP, it says nothing about the direction 
of causality. Third, in output hypothesis, investment should be defined as 
expenditure exclusively on plant and equipment, but many statistics calculation did 
not separate between expenditure on plant and equipment and other type of 
expenditure such as inventory or financial assets. 
2.2.2.    Theories Assuming Imperfect Market 
Several hypotheses fall under this theory such as the industrial organization 
hypothesis, the internalization hypothesis, the location hypothesis, the eclectic 
theory, the product life cycle hypothesis and the oligopolistic reaction hypothesis. 
All of these hypotheses will be discussed consecutively. 
The Industrial Organization Hypothesis 
According to this hypothesis, when a multinational company establishes a 
subsidiary outside its home country, it will encounter many disadvantages when 
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competing with domestic company. These disadvantages derive from various 
differences in culture, language, the legal system, and many intercountry 
differences. For example, foreign companies more often have to pay higher wages 
for the same quality workers since working with them is associated with high risk 
and uncertainty. It happens to language differences as well, as  foreign companies 
should bear extra cost to overcome the language barrier. 
Therefore, in order to deal with these disadvantages, foreign companies must 
possess some advantages. These comparative advantages should be innate 
advantages that can be easily transferred to foreign subsidiaries and large enough to 
surpass these disadvantages. (Lall & Streeten, 1977) provided a comprehensive 
advantages of foreign company as presented in table 2.1. 
Table 2-1 Innate Advantages of Foreign Company 
Advantage Description 
Capital 
Larger or cheaper cost of capital than local or smaller 
foreign competitors 
Management 
Superior management in the form of greater 
efficiency of operation or greater entrepreneurial 
ability to take risk or to identify profitable ventures 
Technology 
Superior technology in the form of ability to translate 
scientific knowledge into commercial use. This 
involves the functions of discovering new processes 
and products, product differentiation and various 
support activities 
Access to raw materials 
Privilege access to raw material arising from the 
control of final markets, transportation of the 
product, processing, or the production of the material 
itself 
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Economies of scale 
The financial and expertise to set up and operate 
facilities that enjoy these economies 
Bargaining and political power 
The ability to extract concessions and favorable 
terms from the host government 
Source: (Lall & Streeten, 1977) 
Its difficulties to sell or lease these innate advantages abroad possibly 
become the reason why FDI arise. These advantages also explain why a 
multinational company succeeds in a foreign market.  
Despite its sound theoretical underlying, this hypothesis failed to explain 
why multinational companies do not utilize these advantages by producing in home 
country and then exporting abroad as FDI alternative. Moreover, even though they 
already opt for FDI than export, this hypothesis cannot support logical explanation 
of why they choose country A rather than country B. Answers for these questions 
are  provided in the following section. 
The Internalization Hypothesis 
According to this theory, FDI emanates from company’s action to substitute 
market transaction with internal transaction. This theory explains why companies 
prefer FDI than exporting or importing from abroad or licensing. For example if 
there is a problem in production process regarding short supply in raw material, a 
company may decide to establish a subsidiary company abroad in producing that 
raw material to ensure that raw material is available. Similar problems might arise 
from imperfection and failure of market for other intermediary goods or services 
such as labor, knowledge, marketing, and resource endowment.  
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Moosa (2002) mentioned several advantages of internalization such as 
avoiding of time lags, bargaining and buyer uncertainty. In association to the time 
lag, bargaining and uncertainty, companies replace some of market function for 
intermediary goods or services with internal process such as intra-company 
transaction. For that reason, researchers claimed that internalization theory 
represents the main body of FDI theory, and considered others as a subset of   this   
theory. 
The Location Hypothesis 
 Some of production factors such as labor and natural resources endowment 
are immobile.  Therefore, this condition directs investors to search for locational 
advantage in minimizing production cost. Locational advantage will eventually 
encourage FDI inflow. One form of location-related advantage in factor production 
cost is low wages locational advantage. In this case, difference in wages rate 
between host country and home country is regarded as a significant determinant 
factor of  FDI inflow. That is why countries with lower level of wages attract labor-
intensive FDI from countries with higher level of wages. In this case, the relation 
between FDI inflow and wages is negative which means the lower the wages, the 
more FDI flows into host countries. Textile and footwear industries are the most 
common example of this phenomenon.  
Empirical studies supporting the hypothesis that low labor cost attracts FDI 
are mixed. Most of the studies apply econometrics analysis with panel data or time 
series when testing this hypothesis. Vijayakumar, et al (2010) conducted empirical 
analysis test for FDI determinants in BRICS Countries during period 1975 to 2007. 
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The result showed a negative relationship between FDI and labor cost.  The 
explanation for this negative relationship could be a lower wages in the host country 
compared to home country means decreasing cost of production, which rationally 
should encourage production in such a host country and consequently FDI. 
The Eclectic Theory. 
Dunning (1987) proposed a theoretical framework to examine the flow of 
investments from a foreign country to a host country and institute it as eclectic 
theory. Till today, this theory is still relevant. According to Dunning (1987), there 
are three main aspects causing the flow of capital from a foreign country to host 
country. First, there must be ownership advantage of the investor company. This 
advantage is very specific in each company and required as compensation to offset 
disadvantage a company might encounter during investment in the host country. 
Ownership advantage can take the form of a monopoly on a particular product or 
brand, a more efficient production processes, management skills and greater 
knowledge about the market or marketing techniques. Out of those advantages, there 
are also internal factors in the home country which stimulate companies to expand 
their operation abroad such as high wage rates, increasingly expensive energy, 
limited resources, and tight regulation on environment.  Second, the host country 
must have a location advantage to be able to attract foreign investors to invest their 
capital. This advantage will be an enticement for potential investors to exploit the 
existing potential advantages for the sake of business. Location advantage can be 
enormous domestic potentials, high growth, low inflation, cheap labor, abundant 
natural resources, availability of infrastructure, attractive incentives, and lax 
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regulation on environmental control. If the first condition is fulfilled, but the second 
condition is not satisfied, investors, (in this term a multinational company), will 
choose to export to host country as a way to exploit ownership advantage. Third, 
although the first and second conditions are met, there must be a stimulus in 
internalizing factor that encourages firms or foreign investors to invest directly in 
the form of FDI and not the other way such as licensing, franchising or investment 
portfolio. Those three factors are a representation of the previous three hypotheses 
consist of the industrial organization hypotheses, the internalization hypothesis and 
the location hypotheses. Those three hypotheses are integrated into eclectic theory.  
The Product Life Cycle Hypothesis 
Vernon (1966) developed this hypothesis when explaining US multinational 
companies’ growth after World War II. In this hypothesis, product life cycle, which 
consists of initiation, exponential growth, slowdown, and declining, is used as an 
explanation of FDI inflow specially in manufacturing companies serving high 
elasticity goods with advanced technology.  
According to this hypothesis, FDI development follows the pattern of 
product cycle model. During the first step, a product is manufactured domestically 
and consumed domestically, the rest of it will be exported. In the second stage, the 
product might be produced abroad by branches of multinational companies. At this 
stage, most of demand for domestic consumption have begun to be imported. Finally 
in the third stage, the product is manufactured in foreign countries via FDI or 
licensing, while its own country has to import the necessary products. 
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This hypothesis was then refined by Vernon (1977).  In his new hypothesis, 
innovation emerges as a new factor. It is driven by the need to respond to more 
fierce competition and larger profit opportunities. In this refined hypothesis, new 
product is developed and manufactured domestically since it is designed for local 
needs and produced better efficiency in coordination between research and 
development (R&D) division, production division and marketing division. Having 
established this product cycle domestically, company may begin to export its 
product for international demand. If the opportunity cost of production abroad rises, 
company may start devising appropriate location to invest their resources. 
 The Oligopolistic Reactions Hypothesis 
In oligopolistic reaction hypothesis, company by one another take action and 
reaction over others’ activities as an attempt to maintain their existence in market 
shares. Kreinin, et al. (1999) stated that securing  company’s existence in market 
share is the most salient motivation for FDI.  One example in this hypothesis is a 
movement by one company to establish subsidiary abroad will be perceived by its 
rival as a threat on their market shares. Therefore, this action invites a counter action 
to slacken its effect and returned back to the status quo equilibrium.  
Knickerbocker (1973) stated that oligopolistic reaction increases as level of 
concentration rises and decrease along with product diversity. In his research on 
manufacturing FDI over 187 US Multinational companies, he discovered that 
oligopolistic companies are willing to respond for any advantage that they might 
obtain from FDI and stabilize their position once a competitive equilibrium 
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achieved. He also found that FDI profitability is highly and positively correlated 
with industrial concentration and negatively correlated with product diversity. 
2.2.3.    Other Theories of Foreign Direct Investment 
There are four hypotheses will be presented in this section. Those are the 
internal financing hypothesis, the currency area hypothesis, the hypothesis of 
diversification, and finally Kojima hypothesis. 
The Internal Financing Hypothesis 
This hypothesis postulated exploitation of profit earned by subsidiary 
company abroad to finance the expansion of FDI where it is located.  When 
investing abroad, multinational companies allocated a portion of their resources for 
initial investment. Next expansion of this investment will be financed by reinvesting 
profit earned from its operation in the host country. This implies that a relationship 
could exist between internal income and investment expenditure. This relationship is 
quite rational since internal financing offers lower cost than external financing.  
Hartman (1984) on the basis of taxation system in home country persuaded 
that because repatriation of profit from host country to home country is considered 
as tax liability, home country’s income tax must have an impact on FDI. The 
implication of this study is that in order to generate maximum profit after tax, a 
company must finance its foreign investment expansion by utilizing foreign 
exchange earned in host country as great as possible.  
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The Currency Areas Hypothesis and the Effect of the Exchange Rate 
This hypothesis postulated that a company within a country sustained with a 
strong currency inclines to invest abroad. On the other hand, a company within a 
weak currency country has fewer tendencies to invest abroad. According to this 
hypothesis a country with a strong currency acts as sources of FDI or home 
countries whereas a country with a weak currency will be the recipient countries or 
host countries. 
We can test this hypothesis empirically by examining the relationship 
between FDI inflow and currency value. Validity of this hypothesis should prove 
that overvaluation of a currency is associated with FDI outflows, and undervaluation 
of the currency must have a connection with FDI inflows. Cleeve (2008) conducted 
a cross-sectional analysis on determinants of FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa including 
exchange rate in his independent variable model. The result is, together with other 
macroeconomic factors, exchange rate contributes around 30% of variation in FDI 
Inflow within Sub-Saharan Africa countries.  Moreover, Froot & Stein (1991)  
explained the rationale behind this hypothesis. A depreciation of domestic currency 
decreases the domestic asset price in terms of other foreign currency and attracts 
foreign investors to invest their capital. At the same time, foreign assets become 
more expensive for domestic investors and impede them from investing abroad.  
This condition explains increasing in US’ FDI inflow during the depreciation of US 
Dollar around 1985. 
Regardless the rational theoretical background underlying this hypothesis, it 
does not mean that it is flawless. According to Lizondo (1991), this hypothesis 
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cannot explain why FDI exist in economies with similar currency, and why FDI tend 
to concentrate in certain industries.  Moreover, Dunning (1973) suggested that this 
hypothesis give support to the industrial organization hypothesis since country risk 
affect the relationship of the investor and its competitor.  
The Hypothesis of Diversification with Barriers to International Capital Flows 
There are two requirements that should be fulfilled when a company would 
like to carry out international diversification. First, the barriers or cost exist for 
direct investment flow should be smaller than those associated with portfolio flows. 
Second, investors should acknowledge that multinational companies provide 
diversification opportunities. Agmon & Lessard (1977)  tested this hypothesis by 
examining the relationship between company’s stock prices and international 
operation. The result showed that stock prices of the company with relatively large 
international operational scale are more closely associated to the rest-of-the world 
market factor and less to the domestic market factors than stock prices of companies 
that are domestically operating. 
The Kojima Hypothesis 
According to Kojima (1975), FDI provides means for transferring capital, 
managerial skill and technology from home country to host country. This idea 
represents a “macroeconomic approach“ or “factor endowment approach” in 
explaining FDI flow. Kojima’s hypothesis lays on the idea of complementarities 
between trade and FDI.  It emphasizes the need for comparing the costs between two 
of them. In this hypothesis, FDI is classified into two categories. First, FDI as a 
trade-oriented which means there will be an excess demand for export and excess 
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demand for import in trade terminology. This category would promote trade and 
benefit industrial restructuring process in both countries. The second is FDI as an 
anti-trade-oriented as the opposite of the first category. This will generate an adverse 
effect on trade, and harm the industrial restructuring process in both countries.  
2.2.4.    Theories Based on Other Factors  
Two factors will be discussed in this sub chapter. Those are political risk and 
country risk, and tax policy. 
Political Risk and Country Risk 
Political risk is a form of unexpected change in legal and fiscal condition in 
the recipient country which will change the economic result of an investment in an 
extreme way. Let say, for example, the sudden decision to impose a restriction on 
capital or profit repatriation from host country to home country will jeopardize the 
cash flow of investing companies.  
Sometimes country risk concept is applied instead of political risk. The 
example of country risk is economic factors which may pose economic risk due to 
adverse sign in economic indicators (such as high inflation rate and depreciated 
currency). It should be noted that negative economic indicators can affect cash flow 
adversely and finally discourage FDI. 
Tax Policies 
Domestics and foreign tax policies affect the incentive to engage in FDI. 
According to Moosa (2002), there are three approaches in which tax policies affect 
multinational companies decision making. First, tax on income earned from abroad 
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operational will affect net return of foreign investment. Second, tax on income 
obtained in home country impacts the domestic net of return and eventually will 
affect fund allocation for foreign investment. Third, tax treatment affects the 
magnitude   of cost of capital for both foreign investment and domestic investment.  
Numerous studies have been carried out to analyze the relationship between 
international taxation and FDI. However, many of them found difficulties in 
identifying the effects of taxes on the FDI. Moosa (2002) explained the reasons of 
these difficulties. First, cross-sectional variation in countries’ tax rate and tax system 
may be correlated with a number of observable and unobservable factors that differ 
from one country to another. Second, time series variation in tax rate may not be 
adequate to identify tax effect, since tax rate is rarely change. Third, possibly, tax 
policy has no effect on FDI.  
2.3. Tax Incentives in Attracting FDI 
2.3.1.  Tax Influence on FDI  
Levying taxes on the transaction or business activity is one of the 
considerations to promote economic efficiency. Tax neutrality requires that the tax 
provisions do not discriminate treatment for any activity or other economic 
decisions. Tax is one crucial factor for investors in determining the decision to 
invest in a country. Theoretically, taxes affect investment decisions because tax 
assessment influences the amount of investors’ benefits and costs. However, 
econometric studies, which try to find the relationship between tax and FDI, ended 
up with inconclusive decision since there are many variables giving influence on 
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FDI inflow. Easson (2004) explained the importance of taxation in investment 
decision into four broad generalization: 
1. Taxes play little role in the initial decision to invest abroad 
Countries with high income tax rate would induce companies to invest 
abroad more than countries with lower income tax rate. The logical explanation for 
this in terms of cost of production is that high level of taxes contributes in raising 
labor cost and might be a stimulus for company to dislocate its production to 
countries with lower cost. However, many economists refuted this explanation by 
claiming that taxation plays a little in constructing the production cost. Therefore, 
they understate its role as the last thing to be considered. 
2. Taxes may play a more important role in location decision 
Tax provisions and tax rates factor in selecting host countries will only 
become consideration after the decision to invest abroad has been made. However, 
the main considerations for investor in selecting the location are market size and 
political stability. When all main considerations are relatively equal, then taxes may 
play important role in investing decision. 
3. Taxes are more important for some types of investment than for others 
Export oriented FDI is relatively more sensitive to cost factor since 
international market is inherent with its high level of competitiveness. Therefore, 
difference in tax rate will significantly influence investment decision. On the other 
hand, domestic market oriented FDI is less sensitive to tax rate difference as long as 
other domestic competitors bear the same tax provision.  
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4. Taxes are growing in its importance on FDI 
Majority studies conducted before 1990s revealed that taxation played a 
minor role in any FDI decision. However, most recent studies suggested the 
increasingly importance of taxation in investment decision. It seemed that the 
location of destination countries selected by companies is sensitive to taxation and 
becoming more so over time for several explanation. First, as other FDI barriers 
have been eliminated, taxation as the remaining obstacle deserves for more 
consideration. Second, as process of production in multinational companies is 
getting globalized, it will become an international production which involves other 
worldwide companies. This will increase export and import as channeling means in 
the process of production. In this case, import and export correspond sensitively 
toward tax difference.  
2.3.2.  Tax Incentives Definition and Its Categories 
According to (Easson, 2004), tax incentives can be defined as follow:  
“In statutory terms, a tax incentive can be defined as a special tax provision 
granted to qualified investment projects (however determined) that represents a 
statutory favorable deviation from a corresponding provision applicable to 
investment projects in general (i.e. projects that receive no special tax provision). 
An implication of this definition is that any tax provision that is applicable to all 
investment projects does not constitute a tax incentive….” 
 
As it has been defined above, according to statutory regulation, tax incentive 
is a tax facility granted to specific investors that meet certain criteria as stipulated in 
tax law. Those who are eligible will benefit more than those who do not receive tax 
incentives.  
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According to UNCTAD (2000)  there are ten categories of tax incentives 
commonly used by both developed countries and developing countries. Those ten 
categories of tax incentives are: 
1. Reduced corporate income tax rate 
A corporate income tax rate can be set lowered by governments as an 
exception on common statutory income tax rate to induce FDI into some regions or 
specific sectors. Indonesia, Hong Kong, Ireland, and Cambodia are some countries 
apply this incentive. This incentive is commonly targeted toward foreign investors 
who meet specific criteria or to attract additional foreign investment. Malaysia 
imported this incentive in the mid-1980s to overcome decreasing FDI inflow. 
2. Loss carry forwards 
Loss carry forwards incentive permits company to reduce its future tax 
burdens by subtracting future profit with current loss. The idea of this incentive is to 
support investors whose projects are suffered from enormous loss during the first 
period of its production. Governments usually combine this incentive with 
accelerated depreciation and lowered tax rate. 
3. Tax holidays 
Tax holiday is a well-known tax incentive specified for newly established 
companies. Under this incentive, new investors will be exempted from any form of 
income tax during a specified period (commonly three to five years). In addition of 
income tax exemption, governments usually combine it with duty and excise, and 
good and service tax exemption. It is considered as a simple incentive with low 
compliance burden in which cumbersome tax calculation over the tax holiday period 
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can be abandoned. This benefit brings tax holiday into a lucrative incentive not only 
for investors, but also for government.  
4. Investment allowances 
Investment allowances are considered as a stimulus in investment expansion. 
Some portion of investment will be deducted against income tax base in accordance 
to its eligibility. Under this incentive, company will be able to accelerate writing-off 
their qualifying capital investment cost. 
5. Investment tax credits 
In some countries, investment tax credits will be regarded as a proportion of 
qualified investment which will be deducted in tax liability. It is only valid in the 
year of investment even though some countries may consider for extending the 
claim period. A modification of investment tax credit allows unused credit to be 
carried forward in the limited future years to reduce future income tax liability. 
6. Reduced taxes on dividends and interest paid abroad 
It is common to levy tax on repatriated profit or dividends. As dividend tax 
rate increase, investors will be less attracted to expand their investment. Therefore, 
this tax can be discounted to maintain investor’s attraction. Usually this incentive is 
combined with tax holiday incentives by exempting all kind of income taxes 
including tax on repatriated income. 
7. Preferential treatment of long-term capital gains 
The intention of this incentive is to stimulate investor to preserve investment 
and if possible to expand it for a longer period. Special treatment will be granted in 
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the form of reduced income tax rate for a longer period of investment. Other 
treatments could be given by reducing good and service tax particularly on capital 
good expenditure.  
8. Deductions for qualifying expenses 
Some countries prefer to aim specific industry field or specific area in their 
country (specially less developed area) in attracting FDI. These intentions are 
usually equipped with deduction for qualifying expenses toward income tax 
calculation. For example, country whose aim for technological industry 
development will promote R&D project by allowing companies to double deduction 
of R&D expenses.  
9. Zero or reduced tariffs 
In order to promote investment particularly in imported capital equipment 
including its spare part, government can reduced tariff of imported capital goods. 
This incentive will reduce the cost of investment borne by investors. Therefore, it 
will encourage investors to replace its obsolete machine or upgrade the outdated 
plants. Tariff policy can also be used to protect domestic companies from fierce 
import competitions by increasing import tariff on finished goods. However, 
following agreement under the WTO and considering the negative effect of tariff 
war among countries, any governments should think carefully before executing this 
action.  
10. Employment-based deductions 
In many countries with abundant labor force, unemployment rate is an 
inherent condition which is troublesome. Government may formulate tax incentive 
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to motivate investors for hiring more employees in their productions. Therefore, 
labor intensive industry is preferable than fully automatic machine industry. To 
encourage investors, governments may accommodate them with tax credits and 
incentives in accordance to employee number. 
The overall categories of tax incentives can be summarize as follow: 
Table 2-2: The Main Categories Of Tax Incentives 
No Category Specifications 
1 Profit/income-based Reduction of the standard corporate income tax 
rate; tax holidays, loss carry forward or carry 
back to be written off against profits earned later 
(or earlier) 
2 Capital investment-
based 
Accelerated depreciation; investment and 
reinvestment allowance 
3 Labour-based Reduction in social security contributions; 
deductions from taxable earnings based on the 
number of employees or on other labor-related 
expenditure 
4 Sales -based Income-tax reductions based on total sales 
5 Value added-based Income tax reductions or credits based on the net 
local content of outputs, granting income-tax 
credits based on net value earned 
6 Based on other 
particular expenses 
Income-tax deduction based on, for example, 
expenditures relating to marketing and 
promotional activities 
7 Import-based Exemption from import duties on capital goods, 
equipment or raw materials, parts and inputs 
related to the production process 
8 Export-based a) Output-related (e.g. exemptions from export 
duties; preferential tax treatment for income 
from exports; income tax reduction for special 
foreign exchange-earning activities or from 
manufacturing exports; tax credits on 
domestic sales in return for export 
performance) 
b) Input-related (e.g. duty drawbacks; tax credits 
for duties paid on imported materials or 
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supplies; income-tax credits on net local 
content of exports; deductions of overseas 
expenditures and capital allowance for export 
industries) 
Source: (UNCTAD, 2000) 
2.3.3.  Policy Arguments for Implementing Tax Incentives in Attracting FDI 
Numerous arguments have been brought forward for using tax incentives in 
attracting FDI. OECD Tax Policy Studies (2001) stated several crucial arguments 
for using tax incentives which can be classified as follows:  first, international 
competitiveness, second, “market failure” considerations, third, regional 
development and income distribution, and fourth, macroeconomic considerations. 
These arguments for tax incentives must consider other fiscal objectives, host 
country needs and circumstances. Detail explanations related to those arguments 
according to OECD Tax Policy Studies (2001) are described below: 
1. International competitiveness 
Tax incentives designed to encourage FDI, including general host country 
tax relief measures, those targeted at investment in R&D, and those tied to exports, 
are often recommended as a means to enhance the “international competitiveness” 
of a country, by improving its ability to attract internationally mobile capital. This 
view assumes that multinational companies take tax incentives into account when 
making location decisions and that tax incentives operate at the margin to swing 
investment decisions in favor of the host country.  
 
 
37 
 
2. Correcting for “market failure” 
Theory posits correcting market failure as tax incentives argument arises 
from the belief of private market failed in generating appropriate level of 
investment. Therefore, government should interferes by introducing tax incentives. 
One example of market failures is positive externalities in terms of company’s 
research and development. Companies, who conduct R&D experiment, usually 
ignore its positive externalities over other companies. Tax incentives can play a 
positive role by encouraging companies in maintain their interest on R&D project. 
This theory can also arise on account of other factors as well, including 
asymmetric information. Potential foreign direct investors may have incomplete 
information on investment opportunities in a given host country, for a variety of 
reasons. This may result in less investment in the host country than if full 
information were available. In such cases, incentives might be called to promote FDI 
beyond the level that would otherwise occur. 
3. Regional development (income distribution) 
Tax incentives may be targeted at investment in regions where 
unemployment is a serious problem. For example, on account of remoteness from 
major urban centers, tending to drive up factor costs, or labor immobility or wage 
rigidities that prevent the labor market from clearing. Operating from a remote area 
means significantly higher transportation costs in accessing production materials, 
and in delivering end-products to markets, placing that location at a competitive 
disadvantage relative to other possible sites. Certain areas may also suffer from a 
lack of natural resources, tending to put them at a further cost disadvantage. 
38 
 
Moreover, firms may find it difficult to encourage skilled labor to relocate and work 
in remote areas that do not offer the services and conveniences available in other 
centers. Workers may demand higher wages to compensate for this, which again 
implies higher costs for prospective investors. 
In such cases, tax incentives may be provided to compensate investors for 
these additional business costs. Where the incentives are successful in attracting new 
investment, and/or in forestalling the out migration of foreign capital, they may 
contribute to an improved income distribution in the country. There may also exist a 
policy desire to address regional income distribution concerns through subsidizing 
employment through investment initiatives, rather than through direct income 
supplement programs. 
4. Macro-economic considerations 
Tax incentives (typically broad-based incentives) have also been advocated 
to address a range of macro-economic problems, such as cyclical (or structural) 
unemployment, balance of payments deficits, and high inflation. Such incentives 
would not be specifically targeted on FDI, but on investment in general regardless 
investors’s residence. When tax incentives are used to provide countercyclical 
stimulation (by encouraging investment and thus aggregate demand in the 
economy), they are often introduced as temporary measures (for example, 
introduced with a three-year expiry “sunset” clause). Temporary incentives offer the 
prospect of increased investment in the short-term while permanent incentives play 
in longer term. When such measures are used, they are typically announced and then 
immediately executed for better result. 
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CHAPTER 3  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study is conducted by utilizing ordinary least square regression on time 
series data to observe the relationship between FDI inflow and taxation particularly 
tax holiday and tax rate variable in Indonesia during period 1981 – 2010.  Secondary 
data including foreign direct investment inflow, gross domestic product growth, 
gross fixed capital formation, openness, inflation, tax holiday, and tax rate are 
collected to be used in the empirical estimation. Further analysis of the relationship 
will be conducted in the form of descriptive analysis, mainly describing the history 
of relationship between FDI inflow and taxation and explaining the reasons behind 
that relationship.  In short, this chapter discusses the data collection, model 
specification, and data processing. 
3.1. Data Collection 
Secondary quantitative data and qualitative data will be utilized in this study. 
Quantitative data are data in which the containing information can be expressed 
numerically and often analyzed mathematically by implementing statistical or 
econometric techniques. On the other hand, qualitative data often refer to data deal 
with description, where the data can be observed, but hardly possible to be measured 
in rational scale number. Regarding quantitative data, this study deals primarily with 
secondary data in the sense that data set can be easily collected and analyzed.  
(Panneerselvam, 2006) stated that secondary data collection provides easiness in 
term of cost, time and effort when obtaining the data. Secondary data are data which 
were already created for the purpose of first-time use by the creator and future use 
for others.  
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In this study, quantitative data encompass foreign direct investment inflow, 
gross domestic growth, gross fixed capital formation, inflation, openness, tax rate, 
and tax holiday. Assunção, et al. (2011) categorized those indicators above into 
several groups. Indicators such as GDP growth represent market size and 
macroeconomics indicator; gross fixed capital formation can be grouped as 
infrastructure; inflation represents economic stability of host country; openness 
represents the government policy level related to international trade, and finally, tax 
rate and tax holiday represent governmental approach and economic incentives. 
Detailed explanation about those data will be examined closely below. 
Foreign Direct Investment Inflow as Dependent Variable 
Dependent variable in this study is FDI inflow. Referring to the (World 
Bank, 2012), FDI data in this study refer to FDI net inflows (new investment inflows 
less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors where the data 
are measured in current U.S. dollars. Application of FDI inflow in this study is 
important for comparison to other studies since most of studies about FDI utilized 
this variable as independent variable.   
Gross Domestic Product Growth 
One out of several key factors as FDI determinant is host country’s market 
growth rate. It can be measured by the GDP growth rate. Investors, especially 
foreign investors, will be more captivated in countries with larger market size, as 
indicated by GDP growth rate which reflects the level of potential demand.  
Definition of GDP growth as World Bank (2012) clarified is the annual percentage 
growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency where the 
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aggregates are based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars.  The terminology of GDP itself 
is defined as the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy 
plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated 
assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
Various studies indicate that GDP growth is an important sign to indicate 
market attractiveness. Moreover, various studies have shown that transaction costs 
would be lower in countries with high levels of growth (Caves, 1971; Zhao and Zhu, 
2000). The proposed research hypotheses related to this variable is GDP Growth has 
positive effect on FDI inflow.  
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) 
Gross fixed capital formation includes land improvements (fences, ditches, 
drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction 
of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private 
residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. According to the 
1993 SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are also considered as capital formation. 
GFCF data presented in this study are measured in constant 2000 U.S. dollars.  
In this study GFCF is employed as a proxy of infrastructure. This selection is based 
on the notion that other measurements of infrastructure such as roads, telephones 
and ports, only reflect the existing infrastructure and not the potential infrastructure 
as it is included in GFCF. Therefore, the GFCF is considered to represent both 
existing and potential infrastructure.  
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A good infrastructure is a required condition for any country in attracting 
foreign investment. Lack of good infrastructure impedes access for companies in 
managing their production resources. As a result, when conducting investment 
decision analysis, foreign investors always include infrastructure in their formulation 
of where to locate the investment. Accordingly, we hypothesize that GFCF has a 
positive effect on FDI. 
Inflation 
As it is defined in world development indicator WDI 2012, World Bank 
(2012), the calculation of  inflation is measured by the consumer price index which 
indicates the annual percentage change of the average consumer cost in acquiring a 
basket of goods and services over the interval time. World Bank utilized the 
Laspeyres formula when generating this variable. 
Inflation is a common variable which many researchers use as a proxy of 
economic and financial stability. In this context, high or volatile inflation rate 
signifies an explicit evidence of country’s instability and presents a barricade for 
FDI inflow.  Schneider and Frey (1985), Mohamed and Sidiropoulos (2010) and 
Asiedu (2006) in their empirical analysis proved empirically that inflation influences 
negatively to FDI inflow. On the other hand, other researchers such as Vijayakumar 
(2010) and Mhlanga (2010) ended up their empirical analysis with conclusions that 
inflation does not have any impact on FDI. This study hypothesizes that inflation has 
a negative impact on FDI inflow. 
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Openness 
Trade openness refers to a degree of which countries or economies permit or 
have international trade with others. Trade activities include import and export, inter 
countries investment, borrowing and lending, and repatriation of funds abroad. Open 
economies mean greater market opportunities. However, at the same time they also 
face greater competition from businesses based in other countries. From the 
perspective of financial development, trade openness means the ability of an 
economy to obtain funds from other economies, and willingness to invest its surplus 
fund to other countries.  
Trade openness is considered to be a significant FDI determinant in many 
literatures. Many of FDI take form as a substitution or complementary of export and 
import in an economy. Therefore, in this case, trade openness is expected to have a 
positive and significant effect on FDI. The formulation of trade openness used in 
this study is a percentage of (Export + Import) / GDP.  
Tax Rate 
There are many types of tax rate in which researchers are interested in 
determining the relationship between tax rate and FDI. Among those well known tax 
rates are statutory tax rate which is the rate stipulated under taxation law, average 
effective tax rate, marginal effective tax rate, and real effective tax rate. Average 
effective tax rate represents how taxation affects profit after income tax imposition. 
It is calculated as a percentage of income tax over accounting profit. Marginal 
effective tax rate measures the extent to which tax rates result in the addition of the 
pre-tax profit from an investment project. Marginal effective tax rate measured to 
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which extent income tax will contribute to additional earning before tax in an 
investing project. The calculation of marginal tax rate is by dividing the percentage 
of increasing or decreasing one unit of tax rate by percentage of increasing or 
decreasing in earning before tax.  
In this study, statutory income tax rate based on income tax act in Indonesia 
will be utilized.  Out of several layers of income tax rate, the highest tax rate 
imposed on income will be used in this study. There are several reasons for selecting 
statutory income tax rate than the others. First, statutory tax rate is the easiest way to 
measure tax burden level compared to other methods. Second, statutory tax rate 
plays an important role in country selection by multinational companies because 
companies are more likely to choose a country with low tax rates. As such, this 
study hypothesizes that tax rate has a negative impact on FDI.  
Tax Holiday 
Tax holiday has been implemented by many developing countries and 
transition economies in attracting FDI inflow. This incentive is intended toward new 
established firm rather than currently existing companies. New companies are 
exempted from the burden of income tax over a specified period of time and usually 
this period can be extended for a subsequent period at a lower tax rate.  
This study exploits tax holiday as a dummy variable, representing the 
presence or absence of tax holiday over the period of 1981 to 2010. Taxation and 
investment regulation correspond to tax holiday will be analyzed to determined the 
year in which it is present. There are several regulations related to tax holiday over 
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period 1967 to 2010. First, Indonesia Law number 1 of 1967 concerning Foreign 
Investment and Indonesia Law number 11 of 1970 concerning Amendment and 
Supplement to law number 1 of 1967. In these regulations, the basic idea of tax 
incentives in Indonesia was originated under Suharto era. Indonesia began its tax 
incentive in 1967 when Law number 1 of 1967 was enacted. Second, Law number 7 
of 1983 concerning Income Tax which is clearly stipulating the abolishment of tax 
incentives including tax holiday starting from 1984. This law put Indonesia as the 
first country in South East Asian which eliminated tax incentives while other 
countries were actively promoting it. Third, Indonesian Law number 10 of 1994 
concerning Amendment of Law number 7 of 1983 concerning Income Tax. This law 
administered an opportunity of tax holiday granted to new investors. In correspond 
to tax holiday, Indonesia government promulgated Government Regulation number 
45 of 1996 which regulate tax holiday given to specific new foreign firm for a 
period of maximum 10 years. Fourth, Government Regulation number 148 of 2000 
concerning income tax facility for specific investors. This regulation nullified tax 
holiday regulation as regulated in Government regulation number 45 of 1996. The 
new tax incentives such as accelerated depreciation, and lowering tax rate were 
stipulated in this regulation, but those incentives are different from tax holiday.  To 
be clearly understood, the summary of tax holiday regulation history in Indonesia 
will be presented as follows:  
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Table 3-1: Tax Holiday History in Indonesia 
Period Regulation Explanation 
Presence of Tax 
Holiday 
1967 - 1983 1. Law No. 1 of 1967 
2. Law No. 11 of 
1970 
First provision of Tax 
Holiday  
Yes 
1984 - 1996  Law No. 7 of 1983 
 
Abrogation of Tax 
Holiday Provision 
No 
1996 – 2000 1. Law No. 10 of 
1994 
 
2. Government 
Regulation number 45 of 
1996 
Amendment of Law 
No. 7 of 1983. 
Re-enactment of Tax 
Holiday 
Yes 
2000 – 2011 Government Regulation 
No.  148 of 2000 
Nullification of Gov. 
Reg. No. 45 of 1996  
No 
Source :  Summary of Indonesian Tax Holiday Regulation. 
 The summary of all variables exercised in this study can be presented as 
follows: 
Table 3-2:  Data and Sources 
Variable Explanation Unit Source 
Dependent Variable:    
FDI Inflow 
Net foreign investment to 
Indonesia  
US $ 
World Development 
Indicator 
Independent Variable: 
 
 
 
GDP Growth 
GDP Growth as percentage 
increase or decrease of 
Indonesian GDP. 
% 
World Development 
Indicator 
GFCF 
Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation in Indonesia. 
US $ 
World Development 
Indicator 
Inflation 
Inflation as measured by 
Consumer Price Index 
% 
World Development 
Indicator 
Openness 
The level of trade openness 
in host country.  
(Export + Import) / GDP 
% 
World Development 
Indicator 
Tax Rate 
Highest Statutory tax rate 
according to Indonesia 
Income Tax Law 
% 
Indonesian 
Regulation 
Tax Holiday 
The presence or absence of 
Tax Holiday (TH) 
Provision represented by: 
1 for presence of TH 
0 for absence of TH 
Dummy Variable 
Indonesian 
Regulation 
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3.2. Model Specification 
Following to previous empirical researches Mengitsu (2009) and  
Vijayakumar (2010), this model employs several independent variables comprise of 
Gross Domestic Product Growth (GDP Growth), Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
(GFCF), Inflation (INF), Trade Openness (Openness), Tax Rate (Tax Rate), and Tax 
Holiday (TH) while Foreign Direct Investment Inflow (FDI Inflow) is treated as 
dependent variable.  
Since this study emphasizes the relationship between dependent variable 
(FDI inflow) and independent variable taxation (tax rate and tax holiday), other 
independent variables will be treated as control variables. Therefore, model 
specification of this study can be formulated as follow: 
                                                                       
                                                               
                                              
Where : 
FDI  : Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflow 
GDP Growth : Gross Domestic Product Growth 
GFCF  : Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
Inflation : Inflation based on Consumer Price Index 
Openness : Trade Openness on (Export + Import) / GDP 
Tax Rate : Highest Statutory Tax Rate according to Income Tax Law 
Tax Holiday : Dummy of the presence or absence of Tax Holiday Facility. 
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3.3. Data Processing  
Gujarati (2005) explained that regression analysis is a study concerning the 
relationship of dependent variable with one or more independent variables in 
estimating or predicting the population means or average of dependent variable from 
the fixed values of independent variables. In this study, the regression model is 
exercised in the form of linear regression.  
Regression type in which this study employs is a time series regression 
analysis by implementing Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method. OLS regression 
analysis constitutes an approach in predicting or forecasting the dependent variable 
based on one or more independent variable in such a manner that the error term or 
residual between predicted variable and real variable is minimized as small as 
possible. In this study, since the limelight of this study is taxation, the objective of 
OLS regression is to forecast the relationship between FDI inflow and taxation, by 
keeping other independent variables as control variables. Time series data covering 
1981 to 2010 will be processed for regression analysis by utilizing econometrics 
software Stata version 12.0. The reason of using OLS in this study can be described 
as follows: 
1. It is extensively used by many econometricians because of its intuitively 
appealing and relatively less complicated in terms of mathematics calculation 
than other methods. 
2. OLS offers the most reliable way under comfortable calculation in predicting the 
relationship between dependent variable and independent variable which is the 
main objective of this study. 
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3. Adequate data sufficiency needed in this method is of moderate size compared to 
sophisticated data requirement in other methods, which is hardly possible, to be 
retrieved. 
3.4. Model Evaluation 
After a multiple linear regression model is determined, the next step is to 
evaluate the model. Evaluation of the model is intended to decide whether the 
estimations of model parameters are theoretically meaningful and statistically 
significant. There are three criteria used to evaluate the model. Each of the criteria 
will be discussed as below: 
3.4.1. Statistics Criterion 
This criterion is determined by the statistical theory, including the value of 
the coefficient of determination (R
2
) and t test of all the equations are used. When all 
models meet the predefined statistical criterion, it can be preceded to the next step.  
3.4.2. Econometrics Criteria 
These criteria are testing of econometric based on OLS assumptions. Several 
criteria include normality test, omitted variable test, multicollinearity test, 
autocorrelation test and heteroscedasticity test. 
Normality test 
One of the assumptions in classical linear regression model is that the 
residual has to be normally distributed. According to Agresti & Finlay (2007), 
although normality is not required in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the 
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regression coefficients, for valid hypothesis testing, the normality assumption 
assures that the p-values for the t-tests and F-test will be valid. 
This paper uses the Shapiro WilkW test of normality in order to find out 
whether the residual is normally distributed or not. If the p value is statistically not 
significant, we do not reject the normality assumption. Therefore the residual of the 
estimated regression is normally distributed. 
Omitted Variable Test 
A model specification error can occur when one or more relevant variables 
are omitted from the model or one or more irrelevant variables are included in the 
model. If relevant variables are omitted from the model, the common variance they 
share with included variables may be wrongly attributed to those variables, and the 
error term is inflated. On the other hand, if irrelevant variables are included in the 
model, the common variance they share with included variables may be wrongly 
attributed to them. Model specification errors can substantially affect the estimate of 
regression coefficients. 
There are many methods to detect specification errors. The linktest command 
performs a model specification link test for single-equation models. The linktest is 
based on the idea that if a regression is properly specified, one should not be able to 
find any additional independent variables that are significant except by chance. The 
linktest creates two new variables, the variable of prediction, _hat, and the variable 
of squared prediction, _hatsq. The model is then re-fit by using these two variables 
as predictors. The _hat should be significant since it is the predicted value. On the 
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other hand, _hatsq should not, because if our model is specified correctly, the 
squared predictions should not have much explanatory power. That is we would 
not expect _hatsq to be a significant predictor if our model is specified correctly. So 
we will be looking at the p-value for _hatsq.  
The ovtest command performs another test of regression model specification. 
The ovtest command indicates that there are omitted variables. It performs a 
regression specification error test (RESET) for omitted variables. The idea 
behind ovtest is very similar to linktest. It also creates new variables based on the 
predictors and refits the model by using those new variables to see if any of them 
would be significant.  
Multicollinearity Test 
The next assumption of classical linear regression model is the absence of 
multicollinearity among independent variables in the model. According to Gujarati 
(2005), multicollinearity means the existence of a perfect or exact linear relationship 
among some or all independent variables of a regression model that can be 
formulated  as follow:  . Where λ1, λ2, … λk, 
are constant and not zero simultaneously.  
The reason why multicollinearity (in this term related to perfect linear 
relationship) should not exist among independent variables is that the regression 
coefficients of independent variables will be indeterminate , and their standard error 
will be infinite. However, if multicollinearity is not perfect, calculated regression 
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coefficient even though determinate will possess large standard error which means 
coefficient cannot be estimated with great precision.  
Gujarati (2005) stated that in case of near or high multicollinearity, 
researchers might encounter several consequences: 
1. Although Best Linear Unbiased Estimation (BLUE), the OLS estimators have 
large variances and covariances, making precise estimation difficult. 
2. Because of consequence 1, the confidence intervals tend to be much wider, 
leading to the acceptance of the “zero null hypothesis” (i.e., the true population 
coefficient is zero) more readily. 
3. Also because of consequence 1, the t ratio of one or more coefficients tends to be 
statistically insignificant. 
4. Although the t ratio of one or more coefficients is statistically insignificant, R2, 
the overall measure of goodness of fit, can be very high. 
5. The OLS estimators and their standard errors can be sensitive to small changes 
in the data. 
Having scrutinized the nature and consequences of multicollinearity toward 
multiple regression models, many econometrists formulated ways and rules to detect 
multicollinearity. One of which methods that will be put into practice in this study is 
variance inflation factors (VIF) which is defined as  . VIF shows how 
the variance of an estimator is inflated by the presence of multicollinearity.  
According to Gujarati (2005), the rule of thumb in VIF is if the VIF of a variable 
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exceeds 10, which will happen if coefficient correlation  exceeds 0.90, that variable 
is said be highly collinear.  
Autocorrelation Test 
In time series data analysis, serial correlation commonly threatens the 
independency of the model. The consequence of serial correlation is that the 
variance of the parameter is no longer the smallest, so it will make standard error 
becomes large and the estimation is not BLUE anymore. 
This paper utilizes Durbin Watson (DB) to detect autocorrelation problem. 
The autocorrelation does not exist if the DB is around 2; otherwise there is 
autocorrelation problem.  
Figure 3.1 Durbin Watson Statistics Rejection Area 
 
Source: Gujarati, D. Basic Econometrics 
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Heteroscedasticity Test 
The last fundamental assumption of the classical linear regression model is 
that the variance of each error term at any chosen value of independent variables are 
constant or equal.  
The consequence of heteroscedasticity is that the variance of parameter is not 
a minimum, and it leads to inefficiency, and the estimated regression is not BLUE 
anymore. This study utilizes Bruce Pagan heteroscedasticity test to detect the 
existence of heteroscedasticity. 
3.4.3. Economics Criterion 
Economics criterion is determined by economic theories. If the sign of 
estimated parameter values is not in line with economic criterion, then the estimated 
parameter values could be rejected unless there are compelling reasons suggesting 
that they can be applied in certain economic conditions. To justify that the estimates 
are different from those described by economic theory, any assumption underlying 
those justifications should be clearly stated. 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
CHAPTER 4  FINDINGS 
This chapter, discusses the estimation results of Ordinary Least Square 
regression analysis which represents the relationship between dependent variable 
(FDI Inflow) and Independent Variables (GDP Growth, Gross Capital Fixed 
Formation, Inflation, Openness, Tax Rate, and Tax Holiday) using time series data 
for year 1981 - 2010. Further descriptive analysis related to historical tax holiday 
regulation will be presented subsequently. 
4.1.  Descriptive Analysis 
Before we proceed further to deep analysis of time series OLS, it is better to 
describe the nature of the variables we use in this regression. Descriptive statistics of 
dependent and independent variables in the model can be summarized as presented 
in table 4-1. 
Table 4-1: Summary of FDI Inflow, Tax Rate, Tax Holiday and other Control 
Variable (1981 – 2010) 
Variable Observation Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
FDI INFLOW 30 2.21E+09 8.87e+08 3.79E+09 -4.55E+09 1.34E+10 
GDP GROWTH 30 5.350373 5.989109 4.067567 -13.12672 9.084714 
GFCF 30 3.38E+10 3.35e+10 1.52E+10 1.34E+10 6.57E+10 
INFLATION 30 10.44503 8.896994 9.63666 3.720024 58.38709 
OPENNES 30 54.67367 52.95636 10.77232 39.97386 96.1862 
Tax Rate 30 33.03333 30 4.759624 28 45 
Tax Holiday 30 0.2333333 0 0.4301831 0 1 
 
This study covers 30 observations from 1981 to 2010. One dependent 
variable (FDI Growth) and six independent variables (GDP Growth, GFCF, 
Inflation, Openness, Tax Rate, and Tax Holiday) are summarized in the above table. 
Out of seven variables, only FDI inflow has a standard deviation higher than its 
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average. This condition shows the data are not equally spread. However, it is still 
permissible to incorporate the data into model OLS regression analysis. Moreover, 
the summary of the data shows that all variables have positive average even though 
some of them have negative value as shown in the minimal value of FDI inflow and 
GDP Growth.  
To be more precise about the trend of each variable in time series, figure 4.1, 
4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 illustrate the series of variable FDI inflow, GDP Growth, GFCF, 
and Inflation consecutively. 
Figure 4.1 FDI Inflow             Figure 4.2: GDP Growth 
 
    Figure 4.3: Gross Fixed Capital Formation        Figure 4.4     Inflation Rate 
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All figures above show a shocked trend of sharp plunge of FDI inflow, GDP 
Growth, and GFCF and a skyrocketing of inflation rate during 1997-2000. The 
shock in these trends comes out of economic instability as a result of 1997 economic 
crisis severely hit Southeast Asian countries and political instability due to the 
overthrown of Suharto regime in 1998.  After 2000, FDI inflow and GFCF show a 
positive trend while GDP Growth and Inflation tend to be stable at around 6% and 
10% respectively. 
4.2.  OLS Basic Assumption Test 
4.2.1.  Multicollinearity 
The first basic assumption test which will be undertaken here is 
multicollinearity test. Multicollinearity means that independent variables should not 
correlate one another. If correlation exists between independent variable, then we are 
in the state of multicollinearity problem. In this case, the regression model will end 
up with an incorrect or erroneous result and therefore, invalid conclusion will be 
prevailed.  
The simplest multicollinearity test is conducted by testing the correlation 
coefficient between the independent variables. As a rule (rule of thumb), if the 
correlation coefficient is above 0.85, we should suspect of multicollinearity 
problems among independent variables. Another moderate method, which is 
commonly used, is by using variance-inflating factor or VIF test. VIF value above 
10 will be considered as multicollinearity problem and the problem will be solved 
by dropping the independent variable from the model. 
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Correlation value between independent variables can be shown as below: 
Table 4-2: Correlation Value Among Independent Variable 
 
GDP 
GROWTH GFCF INFLATION OPENNES Tax Rate 
Tax 
Holiday 
GDP 
GROWTH 1           
GFCF -0.0345 1         
INFLATION -0.8433 -0.064 1       
OPENNES -0.727 0.2163 0.7637 1     
Tax Rate 0.1889 -0.7622 -0.0539 -0.3124 1   
Tax Holiday -0.3891 -0.1772 0.4448 0.3073 0.4003 1 
 
Table 4.2 shows that the maximal absolute correlation value among 
independent variables is 0.8433 which exists between Inflation and GDP Growth 
variable. Since the maximal absolute correlation value is below the rule of thumb (in 
this study, it is assumed to be 0.85), we may conclude that we do not have 
multicollinearity. 
Another method, which we will apply further, is VIF approach. The value of 
VIF approach as STATA version 12.0 calculated is as follow: 
Table 4-3:  VIF Value Among Independent Variable 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
INF_CPI 4.83 0.206965 
GDPGROWTH 4.01 0.249651 
TaxRate 3.99 0.250669 
OPENNES 3.09 0.323143 
GFCFCONS2000 2.89 0.345821 
TaxHoliday 1.95 0.512337 
Mean VIF 3.46   
 
Since all the values of VIF are below the 10, we can conclude that we do not 
have multicollinearity problem in the model.  
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4.2.2.  Omitted Variable Test 
This study carries out two tests in examining the omitted variable. The first 
one is Omitted Variable Test (OVTEST), and the other is Linktest. Both of them are 
available in STATA 12.0. The idea behind OVTEST is that this test will analyze the 
model by checking if the model has omitted any important variable or included any 
unnecessary variable. The null hypothesis in OVTEST is that the model has no 
omitted variable. Therefore, we should not reject the null hypothesis if the model is 
built correctly.  
Figure 4. 5. : OVTEST Calculation 
 
According to the above calculation, we find that Prob > F = 0.9535 which is 
highly insignificant even for 10% level of significance. Therefore, we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis and concluded that the model has been correctly specified. This 
model already included important variables and omitted unnecessary variable. 
Another omitted variable test performed in this study is Linktest. The way 
we take conclusion in this test is by carefully observing the _hatsq value. If the 
_hatsq value is not significant, we may conclude that the model has been correctly 
specified. 
 
 
                  Prob > F =      0.9535
                  F(3, 20) =      0.11
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of FDIINFLOW
. ovtest
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Figure 4.6:  Linktest Calculation 
 
In the linktest above, the variable _hatsq is not significant. The _hatsq Prob > 
[t] value is 82.8% which is higher than 10% significant level. Therefore, this 
confirms that we have no specification error in the model. No model modification is 
needed here. 
4.2.3.  Normality Test 
Normality test is performed to determine whether the data in the study 
is normally distributed or not. This study applied Shapiro Wilk test to detect 
normality problem in the model.  Null hypothesis in Shapiro-Wilk test is that the 
data have been normally distributed. If we select 5% level of significance, then we 
may reject the null hypothesis if prob > z for Shapiro-Wilk test is below 5%; 
otherwise we have no option but to accept null hypothesis and conclude that the 
residual data are normally distributed.  
                                                                              
       _cons     -4416808   3.70e+08    -0.01   0.991    -7.63e+08    7.54e+08
      _hatsq     4.67e-12   2.13e-11     0.22   0.828    -3.89e-11    4.83e-11
        _hat     .9677175   .1730797     5.59   0.000     .6125872    1.322848
                                                                              
   FDIINFLOW        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    4.1696e+20    29  1.4378e+19           Root MSE      =  1.7e+09
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.8014
    Residual    7.7091e+19    27  2.8552e+18           R-squared     =  0.8151
       Model    3.3987e+20     2  1.6993e+20           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,    27) =   59.52
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      30
. linktest
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Figure 4.7: Shapiro Wilk Test on Normality Problem 
 
Shapiro-Wilk test calculated in STATA version 12.0 yield value prob > z  is 
6.116% which is higher than 5% level of significant. Therefore, we can safely 
conclude that the residual of this model is normally distributed.  
Graphical method performed by STATA version 12.0 also shows the 
normality of model residual. By using Kdensity command, we can generate the 
normality graph of residual value. The figure below show that kernel density 
estimation resembles the normal density curve. 
Figure 4.8:  Kernel Normality Graph 
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4.2.4.  Autocorrelation Test 
Autocorrelation test is conducted by applying Durbin-Watson Test (d 
statistics).  According to Gujarati (2005), the area in which we do not reject null 
hypothesis and decide that we do not have autocorrelation problem in the model is if 
the Durbin Watson value is located between 2 and 4-du. As the figure 4.9 shows, 
Durbin Watson statistics value is 2.164005 which is clearly located between 2 and 4-
du. Therefore, we may consider that the model is clear from autocorrelation 
problem.  
Figure 4.9:   Durbin Watson Statistics 
 
4.2.5.  Heteroscedasticity Test 
Heteroscedasticity test aims at testing whether the regression model 
has constant residual variance for each observation. If the residual variance of each 
observation is different, we conclude that there is a heteroscedasticity. This study 
carries out Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis of this test 
is homoscedasticity or constant variance. With the level of significant 5%, the 
Breusch-Pagan Prob > Chi2 should be more than 5% for us to conclude that we have 
no heteroscedasticity problem.  
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. dwstat
63 
 
Figure 4.10:  Breusch-Pagan heteroscedasticity Test 
 
According to STATA 12.0 result as shown in figure 4.10, Breusch-Pagan 
Prob > Chi2 is 0.24%. Therefore, we cannot reject null hypothesis and acknowledge 
that we have heteroscedasticity problem in the model. 
To resolve heteroscedasticity problem, this study conducted OLS regression  
under robust standard errors. 
4.3.  Relationship Between FDI Inflow and Taxation 
After we fulfill all of Ordinary Least Square basic assumptions, now we are 
ready to exercise regression analysis. Our model is clear from multicollinearity 
problem, normality problem, autocorrelation problem and the model is correctly 
specified. However, we have heteroscedasticity problem here. To solve this 
problem, we will conduct OLS regression under robust standard errors. STATA 12.0 
gives the result of OLS regression using robust standard errors as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0024
         chi2(1)      =     9.25
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         Ho: Constant variance
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Figure 4.11:  Regression Estimation Using Robust Standard Error 
 
Figure 4.11 exposes regression estimation of FDI inflow on Tax Holiday and 
other control variables. The model is good enough because the R
2
 value is 81.48%.  
Since we have no multicollinearity problem, high value of R
2
 indicated that the 
independent variables (GDP Growth, GFCF, Inflation, Openness, Tax Rate and Tax 
Holiday) succeed to explain the FDI inflow trends. 
4.4.  Statistical Test for OLS Model 
This section discusses several statistical tests covering t-test from previous 
OLS regression. 
T-test is conducted by comparing the value of t statistics of each independent 
variable with the value of t table. By using STATA 12.0, we can easily know the 
result of t-test by comparing Probability of t value with level of significance. In this 
study, we are using 5 percent α or 95% confidence level. If the probability of t value 
< 5 percent, then we may conclude that the independent variable is significant 
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toward dependent variable. To be more precise explanation of t-test for each 
independent variable will be presented below: 
GDP Growth 
 Probability value of t statistics is 0.337 which is higher than level of 
significant 5 percent. Therefore, we may conclude that GDP Growth has no 
significant relationship with FDI inflow. The result is quite surprising since we 
expect significant relationship with positive value of GDP Growth. However, since 
the main focus in this study is not GDP Growth and we only consider GDP Growth 
as control variable, we will not go further explaining this relationship. 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) 
 Independent variable GFCF has a significant relationship with FDI Inflow. 
We can prove it by comparing probability value of t statistics for GFCF with our 
level of significance. The probability value of t statistics for GFCF is 0.000 which is 
extremely small compare to 5 percent level of significance. This significant 
relationship is in line with our hypothesis. Moreover, GFCF has a positive sign 
which is quite reasonable. Therefore, we may conclude that GFCF has a positive 
significant relationship with FDI inflow. The more infrastructures will end up with 
the higher FDI inflow. 
Inflation 
 Inflation has a positive sign and significant relationship with FDI Inflow. 
The probability value of t statistics for inflation is 0.000 which is remarkably small 
compared to 5 percent level of significant. However, the positive sign of inflation 
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over FDI Inflow is quite suspicious. We will not spend much time explaining this 
phenomenon because the reason of inputting inflation in this model is only for 
control variable. 
Opennes 
 Opennes has a positive sign and significant relationship with FDI Inflow. 
The probability value of t statistics for opennes is 0.000 which is lower than to 5 
percent level of significance. The positive sign here is probably due to the open 
market policy from Indonesian government which encourages international trade in 
the form of export and import. 
Tax Rate 
 Tax rate shows a negative signal and indicates a significant relationship with 
FDI Inflow. The probability value of t statistics for tax rate is 0.007, which is lower 
than 5 percent level of significance. The negative sign here is quite acceptable since 
lower tax rate means higher profit after tax for investors. 
Tax Holiday 
 Our main focus here is tax holiday which has probability value of t statistics 
0.359. This value is much higher that 5 percent level of significance. Therefore, we 
may conclude that tax holiday has insignificant relationship with FDI inflow. This 
finding is in line with many researchers conclusion. For example, Root & ahmed 
(1978), and Cleeve (2008) in their empirical research regarding determinant of FDI 
inflow proved that tax incentives is not significant as FDI determinant.  Further 
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descriptive explanation regarding tax holiday will be presented in the subsequent 
section. 
4.4.  Foreign Direct Investment and Tax Incentives History in Indonesia 
In this section, historical analysis of tax incentive and its relationship with 
FDI inflow is investigated. For the sake of convenience in constructing analysis, the 
analyzed period is divided into two sub-periods, namely old-order era and new-order 
era. 
4.4.1.  Old Order Era (Soekarno Regime) 
In the early years of Indonesian independence around 1940s, the political 
leaders of Indonesia, including economic policy makers, were anticapitalism 
because of traumatic experiences during Dutch colonialism for 350 years. This era 
was marked by the takeover of the Dutch companies, and restrictions on dominant 
Chinese economic activities.   
After that, in 1957 Sukarno formally proposed what is called as “guided 
democracy”, a typical democracy which many people perceived as nearly close  to 
dictatorship regime. In this time, investment climate became less friendly to private 
investment, both domestic and foreign. However, in 1950s by foreign loans, 
including from Japan and the United States, some state-owned companies were 
established, including fertilizer plants, cement, paper, chemicals, spinning and 
shipbuilding. 
In 1958, the regime realized that as a new baby born country, Indonesia 
needed capital investment both domestic and capital. Therefore, a conducive 
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investment climate should be maintained. Indonesian government for the first time 
enacted Law number 78 of 1958 concerning Foreign Direct Investment. Even 
though there is no tax incentives provision in this law, Indonesian government 
guaranteed for the existence of foreign company without any expropriation on their 
asset at least for 20 years. This assurance became crucial especially after several 
takeovers of foreign companies for the sake of nationalization.  
There were only measly foreign investment inflows coming to Indonesia 
during 1950s. Among them was PT. Astra International as it is now well known as 
Astra Group Company. Aware of this lack of attractiveness, Indonesian government 
for the first time introduced incentives for foreign investment in Law Number 26 of 
1964 regarding investment incentives grant. In this law for the first time Indonesia 
had tax incentive in the form of tax holiday.  
Even though Soekarno regime under the old order era struggled to attract 
foreign investment by promulgating pro investment regulation, the reality were the 
other way around. No expropriation guarantee as it was promised in 1958 had no 
meaning anymore. Some industry regardless domestic or international were 
expropriated on the name of nationalization. Tin Industry in Bangka Island, 246 
Dutch Companies, British properties valued around US$400 million were all 
nationalized. Finally, the worst decision was taken on April 24 1965 when Sukarno 
ordered to nationalize all foreign-owned companies. Legislative members in the 
house representative supported the idea of nationalization by adopting Law Number 
16 of 1965 concerning The Revocation of Law Number 78 of 1958 regarding 
Foreign Direct Investment in August 1965. Under this regulation, no more FDI 
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inflow was permitted, and no more incentives in any form would be granted. 
Indonesia then plunged into the darkest era in FDI regulation.  
It is hardly possible to present the amount of FDI inflow during old order era 
due to data availability. However, we may conclude that FDI inflow was absolutely 
measly since the new baby born Indonesia was not only facing inconsistency in 
foreign investment regulation, but the most crucial things were no infrastructure, 
political instability, and relatively low market size.  
4.4.2.  New Order Era (Suharto Regime) 
There are three critical points related to tax incentives regulation 
development during Suharto Regime. The first one is the resurrection of foreign 
investment regulation in the beginning of this regime which was signed by the 
encouragement of FDI inflow featured by incentives including tax holiday in 
attracting it. Second is the end of tax holiday provision around 1984 as a result of 
self-reliant internal financing due to oil price drops. Finally, the last one is the 
revival of tax holiday provision around 1996. All of these step stones will be 
discussed below. 
4.4.2.1. The First Resurrection of FDI Regulation 1967 
Well, et al. (2001) described a complete series of tax incentives development 
in New Order Era under Suharto Regime from 1967 to 2000. He started to explain 
the second experiment of tax incentives in Indonesia when it took place in the 
beginning of Suharto regime. It was in 1967 when Government of Indonesia 
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introduced tax incentives policy along with the enactment of Law No 1 of 1967 on 
Foreign Direct Investment.  
There are several considerations as a background of this law as stated in the 
consideration part of Law Number 1 of 1967:  
1. Indonesian economic development requires transformation of potential 
economic resources into real economic strength through investment, utilization 
of technology, expansion of knowledge, improvement of skills, and increases in 
organizational and managerial ability; 
2. The efforts to overcome economic decline and further develop Indonesian 
economic potential should be based on the capabilities and capacities of the 
Indonesian people themselves; 
3. Nevertheless the principle of relying on our own capability and capacity should 
not lead to reluctance to make use of foreign capital technology and skill, so 
long as theses are truly devoted to serving the economic interests of people 
without causing dependence on foreign countries; 
4. Foreign capital should be utilized to maximize advantage in order to accelerate 
the economic development of Indonesia, as well as utilized it in other fields and 
sectors, where Indonesian capital for the time being is not yet being employed; 
5. The need to devise clear regulations in order to fill the needed capital for 
national development, as well as to avoid uncertainty on the part of foreign 
investors. 
All in all, the idea behind this law is to restore and stimulate FDI inflow after the 
abyss of foreign investment both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
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Featuring in this foreign direct investment law were concession on taxes and 
other levies as incentives to attract FDI. The advocates of tax incentives pinpointed 
that tax incentives were necessary for captivating investors to the country, since the 
entrance door for foreign investment had been closed in the beginning of 1960s 
under President Sukarno. With extremely high corporate income tax (around 60 
percent under 1925 Tax Law), tax incentives were inevitably important to make up 
investment climate. This trigger resulted in the second enactment of tax incentives 
provision under new foreign direct investment law. Tax incentives provisions, as 
regulated in article 15 Law Number 1 of 1967, stipulated that foreign investors were 
exempted from corporate income tax imposition and dividend taxes on companies’ 
profit for a period of five years. When the exempted period was over, foreign 
investors were deserved for a relief in corporate income tax rate up to 50 percent for 
maximum 5 years period.  
In article 15 Law No 1 of 1967, it was stipulated that foreign capital 
enterprises are granted the following concessions on taxes and other levies: 
Foreign Investors are exempted from: 
1. Company tax on profits for a period of not more than five years starting from the 
moment the enterprise commences production; 
2. Dividend tax paid to shareholder as a result of companies’ profits distribution as 
long as these profits are earned during a period not exceeding five years from the 
moment the enterprise commences production; 
3. Company tax on profits which are reinvested in the enterprise in Indonesia, for a 
specified period not exceeding five years from the time of reinvestment. 
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4. Import duties at the time of entry into Indonesian of fixed assets such as 
machinery, tools or instruments needed for the operation of said enterprise. 
5. Capital stamp duties on the issuance of capital originating from foreign 
investment. 
If we observe those tax incentives above, especially exemption number one 
to three, we can say that Indonesia already offered tax holidays for new foreign 
investors which were similar to tax holidays offered by other countries.  Moreover, 
tax holiday provisions regulated here is more detailed and well structured than 
previous one in Law Number 26 of 1964.  In this new tax holiday regulation, it is 
regulated what type of taxes being exempted, for how long it is exempted, and the 
starting period in which tax holiday is applied. 
In addition to these exemptions, Suharto Regime also offered relief which 
can be considered as tax incentives. 
Foreign Investors are Granted with Relief: 
1. In the levy of company tax through a proportional rate of not more than 50 
percent for a period not exceeding five years after tax holiday as mentioned 
above is over. 
2. By being able to carry forward losses suffered during the tax holiday period, 
against profits subject to tax generated in the further period. 
3. By allowing accelerated depreciation of fixed assets. 
As we examined clearly, those exemption and relief are applicable solely for foreign 
investors. No tax holiday or tax incentives were given to domestic investors. 
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However, in 1968 Indonesia government enacted Law Number 6 of 1968 
concerning Domestic Investment which regulate tax holiday and tax incentives 
provision for domestic investment. The reasons behind this according to Well, et al. 
(2001) are fairness and preventing round-trip capital. What fairness means in the 
opinion of government is that if foreign investors are granted with numerous 
incentives, then economically, ethically, and politically domestic investors also 
deserve the same right for these incentives. Preventing round-trip capital is the 
reason for minimizing the cycle of capital which means domestic capital will be 
exported and then reimported back as if it is new foreign investor to get incentives 
facilities.  
Several incentives prevailed for domestic investors as it is regulated in 
Chapter VI Law Number 6 of 1968 regarding Domestic Investment are: 
1. Exempted from corporate income tax on the profit generated by domestic 
investors for a period of minimal two years and can be extended to maximum 5 
years. 
2. Exempted from property tax for capital invested in certain areas by domestic 
investors. 
3. Exempted from capital stamp duties for deposit and fund invested by domestic 
investors for a period of five years. 
4. A portion of the profit reinvested in certain area is excluded from the calculation 
of the taxable profit for the fiscal year concerned. 
5. Relief in import duties due to the import of the capital goods. 
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After promulgation of this Law, encouragements in capital investment for both 
domestic and foreign capital were more or less equal. 
In 1970, for the first time, the original foreign investment law was amended 
by Law Number 11 of 1970 concerning Amendment and Supplement to Law 
Number 1 Of 1967 Concerning Foreign Investment. This amendment developed 
detail criteria for awarding incentives for investors so that they would be more 
predictable to investors. In this law, it was regulated that tax holiday will be granted 
by Ministry of Finance on behalf government rather than automatically as seen in 
previous law.  
Several conditions regarding to tax holiday were amended and the entirety of 
provisions regarding tax holiday as stated in article one of Law Number 11 of 1970 
are as follows: 
1. The Minister of Finance is authorized to grant new entities, which invest their 
capital in fields of production which obtain priority from the government, a tax 
holiday for a period of two years starting from the time production is 
commenced. 
2. Additional tax holiday for one year will be granted if the investment 
significantly increases foreign exchange; 
3. Additional tax holiday for one year will be granted if  investment is made 
outside Java Island; 
4. Additional tax holiday for one year will be granted if investment requires large 
amounts of capital, due to the need to develop infrastructure and/or because the 
project faces greater than ordinary risk; 
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5. Additional tax holiday for one year will be granted in cases which are given 
special priority by the Government. 
Totally six years of tax holiday will be given on the investment starting from the 
commercial production started.  
The reason for specifying detailed criteria in awarding tax holiday actually 
reflects the belief about what kind of investments were desired by the government. 
Size of the company, field in which the company operates, location where the 
capital is invested, and ability to generate foreign exchange will incur additional 
year of tax holiday. Government preferred larger company because, at that time, 
only larger companies have the technology that Indonesia needs such as technology 
in energy resources exploration and mineral processing. Moreover, investment by 
larger companies will increase government confidence in its ability to attract 
investment as well as attract other investors to follow. 
There are no data regarding foreign direct investment before 1970. 
Therefore, comparison data between non tax holiday period (1966 and before) and 
tax holiday period (1967 and after) could not be done. However, we can graph FDI 
inflow starting from 1970 as it is presented below. 
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Figure 4.12:  Foreign Direct Investment Inflow (in US$ Million) 
 
          Source: UNCTAD 
Based on the above figure, we can say that Indonesian FDI inflow was 
fluctuated starting from the lowest amount in 1970 at $ 145.38 million dollar. The 
peak of FDI inflow occurred in 1975 at the amount of $ 1292.06 million dollar. 
Possibly this skyrocketing amount emerged as a result of focusing in mining 
investment area. Unfortunately, soon the FDI inflow plunged consecutively in year 
1976 and 1977, possibly happen due to the effect of riots around that year and anti 
Japanese and anti foreign investment demonstration. However, this figure does not 
show the effect of tax holiday on FDI inflow since the whole of those periods are 
covered only with tax holiday scheme.  
4.4.2.2. The Second Elimination of Tax holiday in 1984 
In the early 1980s, some of the supporting arguments for tax holidays 
proposed by pro foreign investors group were losing their convincing power. It is 
because several key investors, to whom these tax incentives were intended to, had 
established themselves in Indonesia. So that the necessity in tempting more firms as 
role models were regarded unessential. Moreover, since the corporate tax rate in 
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Indonesia had been reduced to 45% from around 60% under the 1925 Company Tax 
Ordinance, and tax treaties for the avoidance of double taxation between countries 
had reduced dividend taxes for many foreign investors, the argument that tax 
incentives would be needed to offset the high taxes rate was no longer valid. As a 
result, when Indonesian government started to arrange tax reformation, the 
continuity of tax incentives became a hot issue in internal discussions of the 
Ministry of Finance.  
During the internal discussions of the Ministry of Finance, it was decided 
that the corporate tax rate would be further reduced, to 35 percent, in order to 
balance with other countries decreasing rate.  According to internal research 
conducted by the tax reform agency under Ministry of Finance’s supervision, 
investor’s rates of return would be more or less similar between  45 percent tax rate 
equipped with tax holiday facility and 35 percent tax rate without tax holiday 
facility. Thus, eliminating tax holidays would not have much effect for investors. 
Moreover, the tax reform agency explained that empirical studies in many countries 
showed that tax holidays play a relatively small role in foreign investors’ decision 
about where to locate their investment.  
On the other hand, the proponents of tax holiday did not keep silent. Many 
officials (outside the Ministry of Finance, particularly from Investment Board) 
argued that FDI inflow in Indonesia would collapse dramatically without tax 
incentives. Moreover, tax incentives supporters worried the effect of investment 
climate instability in 1974 when demonstration widespread on foreign economy 
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especially Japanese “dominance” in FDI. Tax incentive, in their perception, would 
be worth enough to offset that instability.  
Having intense discussion under fierce argument, however, tax incentives 
policy as provided in the law 11 of 1970 were amended along with the tax law 
reformations in 1983. One of the considerations driving the change was a fluctuation 
in world oil prices which is unpredictable. That condition, in fact, threatened the 
state revenue sustainability. Government began to realize that taxes are an 
alternative source of revenue which is more reliable than oil and gas revenues.  
Thus, forming the basic idea of returning the basic function of tax legislation as a 
source of country’s revenue (budgetair function) rather than regulate function in 
attracting FDI was a brilliant idea. Provisions on tax incentives that would reduce 
state revenues unequivocally abolished. All of existed tax incentive provisions were 
repealed by income tax law number 7 of 1983.  After the dramatic turnaround in tax 
incentive regulation around 1983, Indonesia started to be one among very few 
developing countries which eliminated tax holiday provisions. 
Year 1984 became the crucial year for both proponent and opponent tax 
holiday since this was the first year of eliminated tax holiday. FDI inflow in this 
year would be “natural evidence” whether eliminating tax holiday was an 
appropriate decision or destructive choice. FDI inflow during the transitional period 
can be portrayed as below: 
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Figure 4.13: FDI Inflow Period 1981 - 1991 
 
    Source: WDI 
The first year without tax holiday as shown in the figure above shows that 
FDI inflow decreased from $ 292 million to $ 222 million.  This declining amount 
according to proponents of tax holiday provision is a real proof that tax holiday 
abolition is a major mistake. Soon they ask for reconsidering of this new policy 
before things get worse. The chief of Indonesia Investment Agency (BKPM), A.R. 
Soehoed said that a large number of investors domestic and foreign were still 
considering tax holiday as a very important incentive, and he suggested that tax 
holiday provision should be restored.  
 However, the value of FDI inflow in the subsequent years showed increasing 
amount of FDI inflow. As it is shown in figure 4.13, the value of FDI inflow 
continued to rise after decreasing year in 1984. Subsequent decreasing only 
happened in year 1986 and then it constantly performed increasing sign. Well, et al. 
(2001) performed a research comparing FDI inflow in the period with tax holiday 
and without it by utilizing log number and value of FDI project to know the growth . 
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The result showed that statistical test of the differences between growth rate in the 
period with tax holiday and without tax holiday is not significantly different from 
zero. Even though FDI inflow’s growth during tax holiday period was slightly 
higher than it in the period without tax holiday, the difference is not significant to 
conclude that tax holiday plays an important role in investment decision.  
 The explanation of decreasing FDI amount in year 1984 according to Well, 
et al. (2001)  is a result of anticipation for taking the last opportunity of tax holiday 
in year 1983. There had been actually an upward blip in FDI approval in that year. 
Since investor already knew that tax holiday provision would be eliminated, some 
investors accelerated their investment a year ahead from 1984 to 1983. The reason 
was clear; they wanted to benefit both tax holiday and net lower corporate tax rate. 
Moreover, according to Well, et al. (2001), Indonesia Investment Agency tried to 
induce investors to accelerate and granted investment approval a year ahead from 
1984 to 1983 so that investors will gain more. The explanation of short fall 
fluctuation in the beginning of tax holiday elimination seems to give clear evidence 
that it was just a little shock during the regulation’s transition and not a permanent 
evidence that elimination of tax holiday destructs FDI environment.  
A long term explanation can be drawn if we pay attention to the long trend of 
FDI in the period of 45 percent tax rate (year 1983 and before) and 35 percent tax 
rate (year 1984 and after) as it was regulated in tax reformation law. Along with the 
tax reformation, Ministry of Finance dramatically changed the tax collection method 
by simplifying it and gave more trust to taxpayer in calculating, settling, and 
reporting their tax compliance. In the long term graph, we can see that FDI growth is 
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higher in the period after tax reform compared to the period before tax reform. If we 
carefully observe this graph, we may perceive that tax rate and simplification of tax 
assessment have a supporting relationship with FDI inflow. This opinion is at least 
in line with the quantitative result showing that tax rate has a negative significant 
value with FDI inflow. 
4.4.2.3. Second Resurrection of Tax Holiday 1996 
The proponents of tax holiday provision did not keep silent with the 
revocation of tax holiday provision. The pressure to revive back tax holiday even 
already started in 1984 when tax holiday was abrogated. Despite the fact that FDI 
inflow in 1980s decade was not destroyed without any tax incentive as it is proven 
by the increasing FDI inflow after its elimination, tax holiday supporters led by 
Indonesian Investment Agency continued proposing re-enactment of tax incentives 
for alluring investment inflow.  
There were several proposals documented in formal memoranda from 
Indonesian Investment Agency asking for tax incentives re-enactment. At least three 
significant memoranda were written regarding this effort. Well, et al. (2001)  stated 
that the first memorandum was delivered in 1987 by the head of Indonesian 
Investment Agency, Ginanjar Kartasasmita who proposed the revival of tax 
incentive as a response to comparative investment incentives in the neighboring 
countries. Indonesia is lack of investment incentives compared to Southeast Asian 
countries such as Thailand. The second memorandum in 1993 was offering a 
detailed proposal of tax holiday types. In the proposal, tax holiday would be 
extended from two years period into five years period plus 20 percent discount of 
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tax related to any expenditure for human resources development and advancing 
technology. Finally, the third memorandum in 1996 was the unconquerable one 
which finally broke up the ban of tax incentives.  
According to Well, et al. (2001), there are several reason behind the pressure 
from Indonesian Investment Agency in proposing tax incentives. First, struggle for 
obtaining power and fundamental different functions of Indonesian Investment 
Agency and Ministry of Finance. The main task of Indonesian Investment Agency is 
to promote investment and not to collect revenue. If tax holiday might attract FDI 
inflow, then the agency will benefit from this even though the cost of tax holiday 
will be borne by Ministry of Finance. Moreover, the abrogation of tax holiday 
reduced the power of the Investment Agency, since they have lost some function in 
investment procedures. Therefore, the restoration of tax holiday would have brought 
authority back to them. Second, tax holiday is an attractive incentive for government 
as well since the cost is hard to be measured. In fact, tax holiday is not a cash paid 
incentive, it is a foregone revenue. Thus, although Ministry of Finance often 
reluctant to grant tax holiday, it is still preferable than subsidy incentives. Third, it is 
easier to institute tax holiday as incentives rather than maintaining political and 
economic stability or building infrastructure.  Many governments already knew what 
investment environment will attract FDI. However, they found it is more difficult, 
need abundant fund and time to establish it, while the shortest way in their mind to 
offset this drawback is by implementing tax holiday. At least in their mind, they do 
something while improving investment environment. 
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In 1996, after accumulation of pressure, the ban of tax holiday was finally 
broken. Government Regulation Number 45 of 1996 Regarding Income Tax on 
Corporate Tax Subjects in certain industries field had been enacted. In this law, tax 
holiday was finally resurrected after more than a decade ban. There are two crucial 
points in this law. First, the length of tax holiday period is extended into maximum 
ten years for investment in Java Island and maximum twelve years for outside Java. 
Next, government did not use terminology “tax holiday”, but the phrase of “all 
income tax will be borne by the government”. However, the effect of both is of 
course exactly the same. Second, the criteria of which industry field will be granted 
tax holiday are not clearly specified. Rather, government established a team named 
“Research Team for Tax Facility Award in Certain Industry Field”. This team will 
study what kind of industry field requires support in terms of tax holiday, and 
recommend to President what companies are eligible for it. In this regulation, tax 
holiday award was considered as discretionary policy than automatically application 
as it was regulated in the previous provisions.  
One year after Government Regulation No. 45 of 1996 had been issued 
government finally granted tax holiday for six companies. The government claimed 
that tax holiday award was issued to reinvigorate Indonesian investment climate, 
after showing a tendency to decline. However, the implementation of this regulation 
drew many critics because the criteria of eligible industry field in which deserves for 
tax holiday are not clearly specified.  
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There were only six companies granted tax holiday as stipulated by 
Presidential Decree Number 38 of 1997 dated 1 September 1997.  Those companies 
were: 
1. Kiani Kertas Corp.  This Company was given 10 years of tax holiday. The owner 
of this company is Bob Hasan. It is an open-secret around public people that he 
is a close business partner of the current ruling president.  
2. Trans-Pacific Petrochemical Indotama Corp. This company received six years of 
tax holiday. This company is owned by Hashim S. Djojohadikusumo. People 
recognize him as Suharto’s family in law since the little brother of Hashim 
married Suharto’s daughter. 
3. Texmaco Perkasa Engineering Corp. This company was awarded eight years of 
tax holiday. This company is controlled by Marimutu Sinivasan. An Indian-
Indonesia businessman who is chummy to Suharto. 
4. Polysindo Eka Perkasa Corp. This company was granted five years of tax 
holiday. This company is a subsidiary company of Texmaco Corp. 
5. Smelting Corp, which had been awarded seven years of tax holiday, is a 
Japanese- U.S. company operating in Papua Province.  
6. Seagate Technology Sumatera Corp, which had been granted with nine years of 
tax holiday, is  an American-owned plant manufacturing electronics components 
in Sumatra Island. 
The effect of discretionary policy in giving tax holiday seemed to be a doomed in 
Indonesian bureaucracy since out of six companies given tax holiday only two 
companies which were actually eligible. The rest four companies were granted 
without understandable criteria.   
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 The fact, that tax holiday regulated in Government Regulation Number 45 of 
1996 is a discretionary policy without clearly specified the prerequisite requirement 
for getting it, made investors loss attraction on it. Investors might not consider it as a 
crucial point in making investing decision since they do not know how to predict the 
result of their tax holiday request.  
 For giving the overall relationship of FDI inflow and tax holiday provision as 
it was regulated in Government Regulation Number 45 of 1996, it is better for us to 
analyze FDI Inflow before and after this regulation. Figure 4.14 as shown below 
graphs FDI inflow during the period without tax holiday (1993-1996) and the period 
with tax holiday (1996-2000). The result seems quite controversial as we can see 
that FDI inflow without tax holiday exhibited an upward trend, and when tax 
holiday was reintroduced again, it turned over downward.  
Figure 4.14:  FDI Inflow Period 1993 - 2000 
 
 Source: WDI 
 The explanation of downward FDI inflow trend in year 1997 is quite precise 
as many other might think. Economic crisis hit Indonesia and neighboring countries 
86 
 
in 1997, which triggered FDI Inflow downward. What happened in 1998 was even 
worst for Indonesia, not only she was still suffering from the crisis, but also the 
economic crises spread into many perspective resulted in economic, political and 
social instability and ended up with the collapse of Suharto Regime. In 1999, 
instability in many perspectives still prevailed, and Indonesia was on the verge of 
collapsing into separated countries. Even one province in the eastern part of 
Indonesia already chose for being an independent country in via referendum held by 
UN.  The overall condition from 1997 to 1999 was unquestionably not a conducive 
environment for FDI. On the other hand, it had a detrimental effect on FDI as it is 
shown by negative FDI inward in 1998. With regard to tax holiday provision effect 
on FDI inflow during period 1997-1999, we can say that tax holiday incentive was 
not enough and probably will never strong enough to offset multidimensional 
instability.  
4.4.2.4. The Third Elimination of Tax Holiday 2000 
During the last tax holiday enactment in 1996, Indonesia experienced 
implementation of tax holiday award on the basis of discretionary policy instead of 
automatically application. This policy, according to Well, et al. (2001), was failed in 
a country like Indonesia. It has disadvantage which is prospective investors could 
not forecast what kind of incentives they will receive. Thus, they have to spend extra 
cost to carry on feasibility studies, preparing information to Investment Agency 
officers, or even bribing decision makers for getting the desired outcome. As a 
result, tax holiday is less effective in alluring investors which operated under 
transparent and predictable rules. 
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Realizing this problem, in 1999, the new Indonesian president B.J. Habibie 
transformed tax holiday under discretionary policy into tax holiday under clearly 
specified industry field list in which tax holiday will be granted. As it was regulated 
in Presidential Decree Number 7 of 1999 Regarding Criteria in Granting Tax 
Holiday for Certain Industry Field, as a detailed regulation for Government 
Regulation Number 45 of 1996, Indonesian government stipulate 22 industry fields 
eligible for tax holiday. Moreover, it regulated that tax holiday award was now will 
be under the authority of Ministry of Finance instead of President as regulated 
before. The effect of this decree was more predictable rule for investors and 
increasing the number of companies eligible for tax holiday facility which means 
higher loss in tax revenue.  
Even though the Presidential Decree was paved with good intention to give 
certainty and more predictable regulation for investors, many people consider it was 
not an appropriate time for giving tax holiday, especially during economic crisis 
when Indonesia did not have sufficient budget even for subsidizing the poor.  Dr. 
Bachrawi Sanusi in his interview with Tempo Magazine stated his disagreement 
with the enactment of this decree since it was only favorable for conglomerate and 
foreign investors rather than poor people. Moreover, tax holiday will only slacken 
government ability in collecting revenue to cover budget deficit. Pressure also came 
from International Monetary Fund (IMF), “a super body fund lender” to whom 
Indonesia relied on in dealing the economic crisis. Under Indonesia’s Letter of 
Intent (LoI) and Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies in May 2000, 
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IMF required Indonesian government to execute several policy actions including 
elimination of  tax holiday and replace it with other investment tax allowance.  
 In year 2000, under the pressure of people and especially IMF suggestion, 
Indonesian government for the third times eliminated tax holiday provision. As it 
was stipulated in Government Regulation Number 148 of 2000 concerning Taxation 
Incentives for Investment in Specified Business and/or Specified Regions, tax 
holiday was abrogated and replaced by other tax incentives comprise of lowering tax 
rate, accelerated depreciation, extended loss carry forward, and reduction in 
dividend tax rate.  
If we take a look at FDI inflow graph as shown in figure 4.15., FDI inflow 
rebound up in year 2000 exactly at the year when tax holiday was abolished. This 
does not mean tax holiday played a negative role on FDI inflow. The upward trend 
was probably due to improvement in economic stability, new trustworthy 
government elected after a series of elections, and promised for a better 
infrastructure improvement. However, the fact that FDI inflow showed an upward 
trend despite the abolishment tax holiday provision indicate its measly deterrent 
effect to offset economic and political instability. 
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Figure 4.15: FDI Inflow Period 1996 - 2004 
 
        Source : (World Bank, 2012) 
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CHAPTER 5  CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter covers two parts: (1) conclusions and (2) recommendations. The 
conclusions are delivered from the empirical findings in response to research 
problems and objectives. Based on the conclusions, some policy recommendations 
regarding tax holiday are presented. 
5.1.  Conclusions 
Based on the facts and findings presented in chapter four, this study 
concludes five salient points, as follows: 
1. Based on Ordinary Least Square regression analysis, this study found four out of 
six independent variables have significant impact on FDI inflow either in 
negative or positive direction. Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Inflation, and 
Opennes are independent variable with positive significant relationship with FDI 
inflow. In addition, Tax Rate is an independent variable with negative significant 
relationship.  
2. Tax holiday as the main focus of this study is convincingly proven not 
significant as FDI inflow determinant. The possible reason is because tax 
holiday offered in Indonesia will never be able to offset susceptibility in 
economic, politic, government policy and lack of infrastructure as previously 
prevailed in Indonesia. Moreover, tax incentives as well as tax holiday specially 
are not the main consideration for investors in investment decision making. 
However, if other main FDI determinants are available, tax holiday will be 
additional point for investors in locating their investment. 
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3. Historical FDI analysis in year 1964-1965 under Soekarno Regime and year 
1966-2000 under Suharto Regime conveyed a clear message that economic 
stability, political stability, effective government policies and security guarantee 
including security from expropriation of investors’ asset are considered as 
decisive factors for foreign investors in selecting investment location.  
4. Discretionary policy in awarding tax holiday as it was executed under 
Government Regulation Number 45 of 1996 for period 1996 – 2000 brought 
uncertainty for investors. They will spend extra effort only for knowing whether 
they are eligible or not for being granted this incentive. As a result, both 
investors and policy makers were easily fall into corruptions, cronyism, and 
nepotism.   
5. Tax reformation in 1984 had proven that lowering tax rate and simplification of 
tax mechanism can attract FDI growth more than giving tax holiday facility. 
Investors appreciate more on lower tax rate and simple tax procedure than 
extended time of tax holiday facility. However, reducing the tax rate and 
simplifying tax procedures need extra effort and precise calculation than giving 
tax holiday facility. 
5.2.  Recommendations 
Refer to the previously described conclusions, this study offers the following 
essential recommendations in order to sustain and maintain foreign direct investment 
inflow as well as sound tax holiday policy.  
1. Empirical OLS regression analysis concluded that GFCF as infrastructure proxy 
is proven to have significant and positive impact on FDI inflow. Therefore, 
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government should put extra effort in developing a reliable infrastructure. 
However, considering the budget constraint, government could cooperate with 
third party in building infrastructure. Public-private partnership scheme could be 
conducted. In addition, tax incentives including Tax holiday could be granted for 
an appropriate period.  
2. Empirical quantitative analysis concluded that tax rate has a significant and 
negative impact on FDI inflow. Accordingly, lowering tax rate accompanied by 
tax procedure simplification will increase FDI inflow. However, lowering tax 
rate can also mean giving incentives of tax rate discount to all tax payer which in 
fact will decrease tax revenue. Therefore, it is better for the government to opt 
for tax rate discount incentive and select the appropriate criteria for granting this 
incentive. 
3. Tax holiday policy should be planned and managed appropriately. The 
requirement in giving it should be clearly stipulated in law in such a way that 
investors can easily interpret without incurring dispute. Moreover, government 
should not repeat the previous mistakes by granting tax holiday based on 
discretionary basis to seal up any opportunity that could bring toward 
corruptions, cronyism, and nepotism. 
4. Conducting cost analysis before implementing tax holiday policy. Government 
should assure that the benefit from FDI inflow as a result of implementing tax 
holiday facility is higher the cost associated with it. This cost benefit analysis 
needs meticulous calculation and analysis. However, the result will lead to 
effective and efficient tax holiday regulation. 
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